

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1440075-000

Total Deleted Page(s) = 43

Page 3 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 4 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 5 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 6 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 7 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 8 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 9 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 10 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 11 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 12 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 13 ~ Referral/Consult;
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Page 17 ~ Referral/Consult;
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Page 19 ~ Referral/Consult;
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Page 28 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 46 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;
Page 48 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;
Page 51 ~ Referral/Consult;
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Page 143 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 144 ~ Referral/Consult;

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AIRTEL
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
N.Y. N.Y. 1/24/56

Mr. TFD-36	_____
Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Boardman	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Parsons	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tamm	_____
Mr. Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Holloman	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

Transmit the following Teletype message to **BUREAU**

THE RAND CORPORATION
IS-R

IS-R
00:LOS ANGELES

The result of the

(protect identity)
which was furnished to the NYO on 1/23/56, reflects

The list of
return cards containing the subject's name is main-
tained in NY file 100-60713-1B86.

is the official
organization in the United
States and is registered as a foreign agent with the
United States Department of Justice under the pro-
visions of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938,
as amended.

The indices of the NYO reflect that the RAND
CORPORATION is a private concern sponsored by the Ford
Foundation engaged in scientific research projects for
the United States Air Force and Atomic Energy Commission.
New York indices contain no derogatory security refer-
ences for the subject company.

- ④ - Bureau (RM)
(1 - Bufile 100-183386) (RM)
- 3 - Los Angeles (RM)
- 1 - New York (100-60713)
- 1 - New York

(#17)
(10)

J.F. Belmont

Approved:

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M

Per _____

EX-122

RECORDED-89

JAN 25 1956

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Page 2

[redacted]
Transmit the following Teletype message to:

The Los Angeles Office should immediately check its indices and also discreetly ascertain whether the contact involved any personal dealings between individuals connected with the subject firm and the Soviets. If so, the identities of such individuals should be ascertained.

The Los Angeles Office should refer to SAC Letter 54-38(N).

Future communications should delete the caption [redacted] IS-R". A copy of all communications should be sent to the NYO for information.

RUC

[redacted]

b3
b7Eb6
b7C
b7E

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

4-22 (6-15-55)

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Records Section

55

☒ Name Check _____ b6
☒ Attention _____ b7C
☒ Service Unit - Room 6524
☒ Forward to _____
☒ Return to _____ Ext. _____

Supervisor
Room 1643

☐ All References
☐ Subversive References
☐ Main _____ References Only
☐ Restrict to Locality of _____
☐ Breakdown ☐ Buildup ☐ Variations
☒ Exact Name Only
☒ Exact Spelling
☐ Check for Alphabetical Loyalty Form

SUBJECT

Address

Localities

Birthdate & Place

R#

Date _____

Searcher

Initial

FILE NUMBER

SERIAL

[illegible]

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 2/7/56

FROM : *yen* SAC, LOS ANGELES [redacted]SUBJECT: ⁽²⁾ RAND CORPORATION
IS - Rb3
b6
b7C
b7E

Re New York airtel to Bureau 1/24/56. [redacted]

[redacted] Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, on 2/7/56 advised SA [redacted] that Rand Corporation received a letter dated 1/13/56 from [redacted] New York City, requesting copies of two studies made by Rand and referred to by her as "Dollar Index of Production of Soviet Machine Tool Industry" dated 4/6/51 and "Dollar Index of Production of Soviet Coal Industry" dated 2/18/53. [redacted] stated she apparently was interested in obtaining two studies Rand had done for the U.S.A.F. which are referred to as "No. R197 - Dollar Index of Soviet Machinery Output, 1927, 1928 and 1937" and "No. RM1042 - Dollar Index of Soviet Coal Output, 1927, 1928 and 1937." He stated these and other studies done by Rand for the U.S.A.F. are unclassified and are often referred to and quoted in economic journals which are available to the public.

[redacted] stated that since Rand Corporation was aware that [redacted] was a [redacted] agency, they had, by letter dated 1/18/56, advised [redacted] that the above studies were Rand Corporation working papers and that they were not for sale. He further advised that copies were not made available to [redacted]

In view of the above, this matter is being considered closed.

- ③ - Bureau (REGISTERED)
(1 - Bufile 100-183386) [redacted]
2 - New York (REGISTERED)
(1 - NY 100-60713) [redacted]
(1 - [redacted])
2 - Los Angeles
(1 - [redacted])
(1 - [redacted])

RECORDED-99
INDEXED-99

FEB 13 1956

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(7)

71 FEB 17 1956

LA - 107

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 100-183386-

1 - Section tickler
1 - Yellow file copy

62-101647-8
[Redacted]
June 21, 1956

INDEXED - 120

b3
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*
[Redacted]
The Rand Corporation
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, California

Dear [Redacted]

I wish to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated June 11, 1956, your reference L-9848, with which you forwarded a copy of U. S. Air Force Project Rand Research Memorandum RM-1674 entitled "Collective Leadership and the Political Police in the Soviet Union" (Unclassified).

Your thoughtfulness in sending this material to me is greatly appreciated. A topical study of this nature should be of great interest. I anticipate reading it with pleasure.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

(3)

NOTE: Enclosure to relet is 55-page document which was detached and retained by Central Research Section for review. Writer of relet solicited comments on material. However, no comments made in view of Bureau policy contrary re material of this nature. Rand Corporation, a research organization, is financed in part by the Ford Foundation funds.

Tolson _____
Nichols _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mason _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Nease _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

COMM - FBI
JUN 21 1956
MAILED 30

b6
b7C

RAND

June 11, 1956

L-9848

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room b6
Mr. Holloman b7C
Miss Gandy

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Enclosed is RAND Research Memorandum RM-1674, "Collective Leadership and the Political Police in the Soviet Union" (UNCLASSIFIED).

The study attempts to trace the evolution of the political police in Russia since the establishment of the Soviet state, to show how its powers and functions changed with shifts in the policies of the Soviet regime, and, finally, to evaluate its role and probable development under the present collective leadership. We hope this analysis will be found valuable, since so little has been known in the West about the status and functions of this vital instrument of the Soviet dictatorship.

We shall appreciate receiving any comments you may care to make.

Very truly yours,

RECEIVED
RECORDED - 120
INDEXED

Encl. RM-1674

20 JUN 25 1956
RECEIVED

EXP. PROC.

JUN 18 1956

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b7C
b7E

detached & retained
CRS after review 6/20/56
Permanently retained
in CRS 6/29/56

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

gm TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: June 21, 1956

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: "COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND THE POLITICAL
POLICE IN THE SOVIET UNION"
BOOK REVIEW

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b7C

Tolson	_____
Nichols	_____
Boardman	_____
Belmont	_____
Mason	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Nease	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____

Captioned document, a 55 page unclassified research memorandum from the Rand Corporation, reviewed by Central Research Section, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, is nonprofit research organization which has received funds from Ford Foundation. Study presents sketchy history of Soviet State Security organization since 1917 and, through hypothetical reconstruction of events, seeks to show possible motivation for past and possible future developments. The study presents no new material requiring action by the Bureau.

no loc Elsa Bernaut and Melville J. Ruggles authored captioned study.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For informational purposes only. INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

- (3)
- 1 - Section tickler
 - 1 - Mr. A. H. Belmont

RECORDED - 81
INDEXED - 81

CONFIDENTIAL

68 JUL 5 1956

62-101647-7
JUN 26 1956

CENTRAL RESEARCH
CR

1 - Liaison

1 - Mr. Shuba

62-101647-10

REC-72

b3
b7E

Date: January 6, 1960

To: Office of Special Investigations
Air Force

Attention: Chief, Counter Intelligence Division

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: RAND CORPORATION

Enclosed are one Photostat of a self-explanatory letter and comments received by this Bureau from [redacted]

[redacted] The letter refers to a publication by captioned corporation entitled "Behind the Sputniks." The letter has been acknowledged by this Bureau.

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b7C

The enclosure is being furnished as you may be interested in the comments set forth. No additional dissemination of the enclosure or the information contained therein should be made without prior reference to this Bureau.

Enclosures (2)

(5)

CC TO
REQ. REC'D
AUG 7 1964
AHC

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Tolson _____
Belmont _____
DeLoach _____
McGuire _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Trotter _____
W.G. Sullivan _____
Tele. Room _____

JAN 20 1960

TELETYPE UNIT

REC-12

62-101647-10

December 23, 1959

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Dear [REDACTED]

Your letter of December 15, 1959, with enclosure, has been received, and I want to thank you for calling to my attention the book, "Behind the Sputniks," by Dr. F. J. Krieger. I also appreciate your making a copy of your observations on this matter available to me.

It was thoughtful of you to keep me advised of your plans, particularly the network radio program which you plan to do in the early spring. When you are next in Washington, please feel free to call my office. Should I not be available at the time, Mr. DeLoach will be glad to discuss this matter with you.

You have my best wishes for a most enjoyable Holiday Season and a new year filled with an abundance of joy.

Sincerely yours,

MAILED 8
DEC 23 1959
COMM-FBI

- 1 - Director's Office - Enclosures (2)
- 1 - Mr. DeLoach - Enclosures (2)

NOTE: [REDACTED] in the attached copy of his views of the book, "Behind the Sputniks," states that the book is similar to the books written about Hitlerism and fascism before World War II which acknowledged their danger but still admired their "achievements." He says in essence that Krieger gives entirely too much credit to the Soviet Union and their scientists without questioning their statistics or recognizing their propaganda. [REDACTED] states that

(NOTE CONTINUED NEXT PAGE)

Tolson
Belmont
DeLoach
McGuire
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

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b7C

NOTE CONTINUED:

the authorities quoted in the book are all pro-communist and that he is shocked at the fact that we have given a great deal of technical information to the Russians while we have received practically nothing from them in return. He expressed concern that Dr. Kr~~e~~iger is on the staff of Rand Corporation (a non-profit organization conducting long-range research for the Air Force), and as a consequence, has access to many of our vital secrets. The Rand Corporation, a research organization financed in part by Ford Foundation funds, has been called to our attention before. We have had limited cordial correspondence with them. Bufiles reflect no derogatory information for [REDACTED] We have had cordial correspondence with him in the past.

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b7C

Mr. Tolson ✓
Mr. Belmont ✓
Mr. DeLoach ✓
Mr. McGuire ✓
Mr. Mohr ✓
Mr. Parsons ✓
Mr. Rosen ✓
Mr. Tamm ✓
Mr. Trotter ✓
Mr. W.C. Sullivan ✓
Tele. Room ✓
Mr. Holloman ✓
Miss Gandy ✓

Dec. 15, 1959

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
U. S. Dept. of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-1-86 BY [redacted]

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Today I came into possession of a Rand Corporation study published in book form under the title: "BEHIND THE SPUTNIKS". I am somewhat disturbed by the general tone of the book, for the reasons set forth in the attached memo. I had first dictated these impressions to my secretary simply for my own files, but in view of the sensitive nature of the Rand outfit, I am sending a copy to you for whatever the impressions are worth.

I might also take this opportunity to report that I have been approached by [redacted]

[redacted] to do a fifteen-minute network radio commentary program, and it is contemplated that this will go on the air sometime in the early Spring. Before launching the series, I would appreciate very much an opportunity to check with you privately to seek your advice on one or two matters. I am anxious that we do the best possible job in helping to turn the present tide of Soviet aggression, and I know that any suggestions from you would be invaluable. Would it be possible to see you at your office sometime after the first of the year?

May I take this opportunity also to wish you a most happy and well deserved - Holiday season.

Sincerely,

[redacted signature]

Enc.

CC: Mr. Cartha D. DeLoach

19 JAN 8 1960

EXP. PROC.
DEC 2 1959
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UNRECORDED

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Photostat made and filed 12/22/59

1-ENCLOSURE

One (your only)
ack 12-23-59

2 Antistats made 12/22/59

62-102

REC D

RECORDED

[redacted]

[redacted]

1-6-60

RUNDOWN

Dec. 15, 1959

~~KRIEGER, F. J.~~
KRIEGER, F. J.

On staff of Rand Corp. (a non-profit organization conducting long-range research for the Air Force).

Dr. Krieger holds degrees from Ohio State and Notre Dame Universities. He has been with Rand Corp. since 1945.

After World War II, member of team of specialists sent to Europe to evaluate captured scientific reports and to interview German aeronautical and missile scientists and engineers.

Author of book, ~~"Behind the Sputniks"~~, a survey of Soviet space science published by Public Affairs Press, Washington, D.C. in 1958. The address of Public Affairs Press - 419 New Jersey Avenue, S.E., Washington 3, D. C.

Latest address for Krieger is Santa Monica, Calif.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-1-86 BY [redacted]

Remarks and observations by ☐ concerning book: "Behind the Sputniks":

This book leaves me with an odd feeling. I am reminded of those individuals who, prior and before World War II, while acknowledging the danger of Hitlerism and Fascism, were still able to admire the "achievements" of Fascism.

In general, the author (Krieger), it would appear to me, gives entirely too much credit to the Soviet Union and to Soviet scientists... or more specifically, to Communism and Communist scientists. I am a little disturbed because Dr. Krieger seems to give equal credence to notorious propaganda platforms as well as to Soviet scientific journals. (For example, quoting Academician A. N. Nesmeyanov at the World Peace Council in Vienna Nov. 27, 1953: Article in NEW TIMES, English language propaganda magazine published in Moscow, Nov. 15, 1956....on Page 229; etc.).

So far as I could tell, all of the authorities quoted in the book are 110% pro-Communist. Hence, the book (which is some 325 pages in length) manages to get in a very heavy dose of pro-Communist propaganda. I cannot help but wonder why it was necessary, in what purports to be a purely scientific journal, to include such passages as (Page 27):

"The reactionary science serving Anglo-American Imperialism sets forth entirely different goals for interplanetary travels. It is not the study of the nature of surrounding worlds in the interest of science, but the search for strategic raw materials for a new war. It is not a research laboratory for the study of interplanetary spaces, but get another extra-terrestrial base for attacking the Soviet Union and the countries of the People's Democracy. American Imperialists, who are possessed by a mania of world domination, are threatening the entire universe and are making extravagant plans for transforming the entire solar system into an American colony".

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ENCLOSURE

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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62-101647-10

[Redacted]

RUNDOWN

- 2 -

Dec. 15, 1959

KRIBGER. 9 J. (Continued)

Or:

"The insane plans of the Imperialists are doomed to failure".

Such passages occur throughout the book in very heavy doses.

On the other hand, although there is evidently material available by Anti-Communist scientists, no quotations are given from these sources at all. For example, only one sentence is given to Colonel G. A. Tokaev, formerly chief of the Aero-Dynamics Laboratory of the Moscow Military Air Academy, who defected from the Soviet zone of Germany to Great Britain in 1948. He is mentioned only to indicate "Stalin's personal interest in the development of long-range rocket-propelled guided missiles" in his book, "Stalin Means War". However, no anti-Communist or anti-Soviet statements of any kind appear at any place in the entire book.

In the body of the book, statements are contained, without contradiction, which I, as a layman, would tend to question. For example, on Page 193, N. Chebodarev states: "In Leningrad, on one of the quiet streets of the Vasil'evskii Island, in a small two-story building, is located the Institute of Theoretical Astronomy of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences. It is the world's only specialized institute whose task is the detailed study of the movements of celestial bodies".

This is an extreme example; however, the book is loaded with similar braggadocio which I believe is certainly open to question. If this book is, as it portends to be, a purely scientific and factual description, why should it contain excessive allegations of communist superiority?

I don't know the answers to these questions; but I do think they are proper questions to raise, especially within an organization such as the Rand Corporation, which is privy to many vital secrets of American defense.

On the other hand, throughout the book there is much revealing evidence of another rather disturbing situation -- not the fault of the authors -- and that is the tremendous amount of information and help the U. S. scientists have given to the Communist enemy.

For example, top Soviet scientists attended the Sixth International Astronautical Congress in Copenhagen, Denmark in 1955.

A top Soviet scientist, Ogrodnikov, was an exchange professor at Harvard in 1937.

Communist scientists attended the "Conference on rockets and Satellites" held on Sept. 11, 1956 in Barcelona, Spain. (At this conference, the Communists obtained plenty of information; they gave no information).

In 1956 the International Astronautical Federation admitted the U.S.S.R. to the Federation, and L. N. Babitsky was elected Vice-Presi-

RUNDOWN

Dec. 15, 1959

KRIEGER, P. J. (Continued)

dent of the Federation.

In addition to attending the conferences, visiting American universities and colleges, and conferri - with American scientists, the Soviet Union also clearly had ready access to all kinds of American scientific journals, magazines, articles, etc. The Soviet written articles quote heavily from such sources. (Example: "The American scientists W. S. Ruski, H. A. Lucy, R. G. Shreffler and P. J. Willig, achieved speeds up to 90 kilometers per second in 1952. Their work was published in the American publication Journal of Applied Physics, in December, 1952").

In reading the book, therefore, I am struck by the fact that we seem to have virtually no information of a specific or exact nature concerning Soviet rocket development, while the Soviet and Communist scientists have an enormous amount of very specific and extremely helpful material from the United States. For example, Dr. Krieger states on Page 18: "Russia unquestionably possesses rocket systems of proven operational reliability...it is impossible to determine the guidance accuracy of their rocket systems...nor have the Russians indicated the characteristics of the individual rockets in the systems used to launch the satellites...etc."

While there is a great poverty of technical information, there are plenty of claims. Again, I am concerned that Dr. Krieger seems to accept all claims without question. For example, on Page 18, Dr. Krieger states categorically: "More than 600 trajectories were calculated by means of electronic computers and were classified as hits, circumflights or afflights". How does Dr. Krieger know that 600 trajectories were calculated? I know, from several years of study of Soviet statistics, that Communist figures cannot be trusted; time and again I have found conclusive evidence of exaggerations, distortions and fabrications, sometimes created for their propaganda effect in the free world, and other times manufactured by the Russian slaves for their Communist bosses. Nowhere in the book does Dr. Krieger mention this tendency, and nowhere does he seem to indicate that there should be any doubt concerning any claim whatsoever made by the Communist Regime.

In summation, my reaction overall to this book is the same as it would have been if, during the rise of Fascism, a book on Hitler's and Mussolini's scientists had been published, together with pro-Nazi claims of superiority, racial superiority, anti-Semitism, etc.

Memorandum

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: March 8, 1960

FROM : Mr. J. F. Bland

SUBJECT: SECURITY CLEARANCE INQUIRIES
CONDUCTED OF PRIVATE CONCERNS
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

[redacted] Columbia Missouri, advised the Kansas City Office on 2-25-60 that inquiries from private investigative concerns have been received during the past year or more, wherein these concerns indicate they are conducting background investigations on certain individuals for the purpose of recommending the individual for security clearance. Samples of two forms received by the school from the Rand Corporation and Dun and Bradstreet, Incorporated, were furnished the Bureau by Kansas City letter of 3-4-60. [redacted] wants to know whether such requests are authentic or whether these firms are using the security clearance slant as a means of obtaining information for credit purposes.

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For a number of years commercial organizations, such as Dun and Bradstreet and the Retail Credit Company, have been conducting applicant-type background investigations on behalf of industry of individuals seeking certain type of clearance for work on defense contracts. These investigations do not extend into the subversive field. The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, is a private concern engaged in scientific research projects for the United States Air Force and the Atomic Energy Commission.

The forms forwarded with Kansas City letter of 3-4-60 fail to indicate that the request for information of University of Missouri extends beyond general background information and verification of the applicants' academic record.

b6
b7CRECOMMENDATION:

(1) That Kansas City be instructed to advise [redacted] of the fact that certain applicant-type background investigations are handled by private investigative concerns on behalf of industry engaged in defense work.

Enclosure Reel 3-9-60

1 - Mr. Belmont 1 - Mr. Parsons
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. Rushing

MAR 24 1960

162-101644-15 90
NOT RECORDED
MAR 18 1960

SUBV. CONTROL

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-13295-

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont
Re: SECURITY CLEARANCE INQUIRIES
CONDUCTED OF PRIVATE CONCERNS

(2) That Kansas City be instructed to ascertain whether inquiries received by the University of Missouri have extended into questions concerning an applicants' subversive activities or loyalty. If you approve, there is attached a proposed airtel to Kansas City.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-394984)

DATE: 6/13/60

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO

SUBJECT:

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During May, 1960, [redacted] advised that

San Francisco indices negative regarding [redacted]

It is suggested that Los Angeles may deem it advisable to further identify [redacted] to determine if he is actively engaged in disseminating pro-Chinese Communist propaganda within the Santa Monica area.

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Attached for the information of Los Angeles are current instructions relating to the proper handling of material emanating from [redacted]

Due to the sensitive nature of this source, Los Angeles should be discreet so as not to divulge the identity of this source.

- 4 - Bureau (REG)
- 2 - Los Angeles (REG)
- 2 - San Francisco (1)

DEC 75

62-101647-11

(8) #12

"NO (pertinent data) located in Bureau Files
(derogatory data) concerning [redacted]"

FILED IN
b3
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5 JUN 28 1960

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: July 20, 1960

FROM : SAC, LOS ANGELES

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

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10-1

Re San Francisco letter to the Bureau. 6/13/60.
under dual caption [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]"

On 7/8/60, [REDACTED] (conceal by request),
Santa Monica Post Office, Santa Monica, California, advised
SA [REDACTED] that [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Santa Monica. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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- C -
② - Bureau (Registered)
2 - San Francisco (Info.) (Registered)
(1 - [REDACTED])
1 - Los Angeles [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
(5)

REC-24

62-101647-12
17 JUL 25 1960b3
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X-112

NAT. SEC. REG.

AUG 11 1960

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records Branch7/28/60, 1959☐ Name Searching Unit - Room 6527☐ Service Unit - Room 6524

b6

☐ Forward ☐

b7C

☐ Attention ☐☐ Return ☐

1517

2256

Supervisor

Room

Ext.

Type of References Requested:

☐ Regular Request (Analytical Search)☐ All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)☒ Subversive References Only☐ Nonsubversive References Only☐ Main _____ References Only

Type of Search Requested:

☐ Restricted to Locality of _____☒ Exact Name Only (On the Nose)☐ Buildup☐ Variations

Subject

Kand Corporation

Birthdate & Place

Address

Santa Monica, Calif

Localities

AUG 1

1960

R#

103

Date

7/29Searched
Initials

Prod.

FILE NUMBER

SERIAL

62-101647

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98-4026994-35891-14R-10762-85557-527101-2483-833 p.4394-3-4-317-323101-249987-46-PX5- AUG 3 196094-51084-1

b3

b7E

101-384554-5100-341825-244

NUMEROUS REFERENCE

SEARCH SLIP

b6
b7CSubj: Rand Corp.Supervisor: RuehlRoom 1517R# 0Date 7/29Searcher
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Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records Branch

9/21

1962

☐ Name Searching Unit - Room 6527☐ Service Unit - Room 6524☐ Forward to ☐☒ Attention ☐☒ Return to ☐

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Supervisor

Room 1517

Ext.

Type of References Requested:

☐ Regular Request (Analytical Search)☒ All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)☐ Subversive References Only☐ Nonsubversive References Only☐ Main _____ References Only

Type of Search Requested:

☐ Restricted to Locality of _____☐ Exact Name Only (On the Nose)☐ Buildup☐ VariationsSubject ☐

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Searcher
Initials ☐

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Buildup of both
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P.C.

October 25, 1966

REC-102

62-101647-15


Library 98
The Rand Corporation
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, California 90406

Gentlemen:

Your requisition dated October 19th has been received.

In response to your request, I am enclosing copies of the two most recent issues of our Uniform Crime Reports bulletin. There will be no charge, and one copy of your communication is being returned as requested. I regret to inform you that our supply of prior issues of the bulletin has been depleted.

Very truly yours,



John Edgar Hoover
Director

Enclosures (3)

NOTE: Bufiles reflect the Rand Corporation handles classified information for governmental agencies.

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Wick _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
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NOV 4 1966 ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

The RAND Corporation

1700 MAIN STREET

SANTA MONICA, CALIFORNIA 90406

REQUEST FOR REPORT

TO: Federal Bureau of Investigation
Ninth Street and Pennsylvania Avenue,
N. W.
Washington, D.C. 20535

The document listed below is requested for use in connection with studies being conducted by The RAND Corporation, an independent nonprofit research organization established in November 1948. Its objective—to further and promote scientific, educational, and charitable purposes—is approached through an extensive program of research and original investigation in the physical sciences, economics, mathematics and the social sciences.

Please address correspondence to:

The RAND Corporation
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, California 90406

Attn: Library 98

Authorized signature _____

Please return one copy of this form with your reply or refer to Request No. 66-1382 Date October 19, 1966

If report is not available gratis, please inform us before forwarding.

REPORT NO.	TITLE	AUTHOR OR ISSUING AGENCY	DATE	CLASSIFICATION
Annual Rpt.	UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS. (for last 5 years)	F.B.I.		Uncl.

Requested for: Retention XXX Loan _____

Remarks:

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REPLY:

REC-102

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- ☐ Forwarded under separate cover.
- ☐ Report is being reproduced; it will be forwarded upon completion of reproduction.
- ☐ Not yet published; to be forwarded about OCT 20 1966
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- ☐ Not available through this office; forward request to _____
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REQUEST TO MATERIAL WHEN TRANSMITTED

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Date: _____

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No acknowledgment necessary. [redacted]
interviewed by WFO 2/12/51 and SA stated that
further interviews or correspondence with him
would be a waste of time. He has previously been
described as [redacted]

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File 62-99965



File
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 2 1971

WESTERN UNION

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Sullivan _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Bishop _____
Mr. Brennan CD _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Casper _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. Dalbey _____
Mr. Felt _____
Mr. Gale _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tavel _____
Mr. Walters _____
Mr. Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Miss Holmes _____
Miss Gandy _____

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J EDGAR HOOVER

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62-99965-

NOT RECORDED

15 MAR 3 1971

EO MAR 4 1971

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Mohr

DATE: February 18, 1971

FROM : J. J. Casper

SUBJECT: THE RAND CORPORATION
SANTA MONICA, CALIFORNIA

Tolson _____
Sullivan _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

The Director, reviewing an article by James E. Bylin, captioned "Super Snooper," published in the Wall Street Journal, 2/17/71, underscored "study for the U.S. Justice Department" (by the Rand Corporation) and asked, "What do we know of this? H."

Our records indicate that a Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) publication, Grants and Contracts Fiscal Year 1970, notes the following pertinent information on page 89:

The National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Projects FY 1970 lists under its number NI 70-057, a grant of \$171,082.90 to the Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, beginning 6/30/70 and to end by 9/30/71, for a study entitled "Private and Auxiliary Public Police in the United States." The published abstract for this grant indicates, "This project provides for obtaining nationwide data on public auxiliary and private police agencies and conducting interviews within a sample of these auxiliary police organizations. Existing laws concerning these agencies will be examined. The study is meant to recommend a basis for standards for the operation and utilization of these agencies and to devise principles for their guidance."

Our files indicate that the Rand Corporation is a nonprofit research organization engaged in research projects and has in the past conducted such projects for the Atomic Energy Commission and the United States Air Force. It has been financed in part in the past by Ford Foundation Funds.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

1 - [redacted]

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REC-7

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Super Snooper

Private Eye Hal Lipset
Shuns the Rough Stuff,
Prosper by Using Wits

Instead of a .38, He Packs
A Recorder; but Only Once
A Chase and a Pretty Girl
A Very Unusual Bar of Soap

By JAMES E. BYLIN

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
SAN FRANCISCO—As a private detective, cigar-puffing Hal Lipset would like to specialize in "stolen diamonds, international chases, beautiful women and large rewards."

Unfortunately, he laments, "I've only had one case like that." But that doesn't mean the 25 years he has spent as a private eye have been dull ones. Over the years he has gathered evidence of infidelity for divorce cases, helped people wrongly accused of crimes, trapped industrial saboteurs, kidnaped children and even bugged a martini olive.

In the process, he has become a moderately wealthy man. His agency handles some 500 cases a year, grossing \$250,000 in fees. From these he pays four other detectives, three secretaries, a part-time electronics engineer and 20 occasional operatives who hold down other full-time jobs. His retinue also includes Lady, a decidedly unfriendly German shepherd who slinks about the premises snarling at strangers. A trained attack dog, Lady, sometimes helps out on bodyguard cases.



Tolson ✓
Sullivan ✓
Mohr ✓
Bishop ✓
Casper ✓
Callahan ✓
Conrad ✓
Dalbey ✓
Felt ✓
Gale ✓
Rosen ✓
Tavel ✓
Walters ✓
Soyars ✓
Tele. Room b6
Holmes b7C
Gandy ✓

ORAND Corporation
SANTA MONICA, CAL

The Washington Post _____
Times Herald _____
The Washington Daily News _____
The Evening Star (Washington) _____
The Sunday Star (Washington) _____
Daily News (New York) _____
Sunday News (New York) _____
New York Post _____
The New York Times _____
The Daily World _____
The New Leader _____
The Wall Street Journal _____
The National Observer _____
People's World _____

EX-114

REC-7 62-101647-18

Date FEB 17 1971

MAR 1 1971 FBI
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MAR 10 1971

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Hal Lipset's office is also his home, a 23-room mansion in San Francisco's fashionable Pacific Heights area. The telephone book lists a downtown address for the Lipset agency, but he explains it is "just a blind" to screen out unannounced visitors.

Mr. Lipset, a widower with two sons, is one of the more successful practitioners of a trade that has been endlessly glorified and exaggerated in paperback novels, movies and television serials. But unlike their fictional counterparts, "professional investigators" (the image-polishing term they prefer) seldom solve murders and don't often dodge bullets while chasing toothsome blondes. Mr. Lipset, for example, couldn't be less like Sam Spade, the dashing character who roamed foggy San Francisco and was immortalized by Humphrey Bogart in "The Maltese Falcon."

Dashiell Hammet wrote in 1930 in the novel that preceded the Bogart movie that Sam Spade resembled "a blond Satan." Hal Lipset looks more like an owlish businessman. Round-faced and bespectacled, the 51-year-old detective never carries a gun. In fact, he can't legally; he let his license lapse some five years ago. "I just got bored with it," says Mr. Lipset, an habitue of the opera and symphony.

Eyeing the Private Eyes

The fictional version aside, private eyes are still somewhat cloaked in mystery. "Very little is known about the field," says a researcher at Rand Corp. To fill the void, the Santa Monica, Calif., "think tank" recently initiated a \$171,000 study for the U.S. Justice Department on private eyes as well as private security companies. An outgrowth of the study, the Rand official says, may be a model code of standards for licensing by states. At present, Rand researchers can't even pin down the number of private eyes in the U.S. One stumbling block: Some 20 states don't require any licensing.

But private eyes appear to be a proliferating breed. California, which requires 4,000 hours of police detective work or other investigative experience to qualify for a license, has 1,037 private eyes, up from 776 five years ago, while New York, with a 5,250-hour requirement, has boosted its ranks in the past five years by about 10% to 725.

Mr. Lipset was a public relations major in college. He became a private eye right after World War II. During the war, he had directed an Army criminal investigation team in Europe. "Every time Americans went into a town, crimes were committed," he recalls. "People were really looted."

The private-eye supply burgeoned at the time because of the small hoard of trained investigators being released from the military and from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which had temporarily expanded during the war. The demand for their services was also rising, especially from lawyers who, faced with mounting paperwork, found less time to handle their own investigative work. These lawyers increasingly turned to private eyes—and Hal Lipset had his first clients. Even today, he considers his fictional counterpart to be Paul Drake, the private eye who does legwork for Perry Mason in the books by the late Erle Stanley Gardner.

"Mental Agility, Hard Work"

"I patterned my business after that image," he boasts. "I do what Paul Drake does—and 90% of what Perry Mason does, too. He's my idea of an investigator. No violence—it's all mental agility, research and hard work."

Though he will tackle any type of case, Mr. Lipset still favors criminal investigation when he's pitted against "all of law enforcement working to prove a man guilty. There's no greater thrill in the world than to be in a courtroom at the end of a trial, see the jury come in and hear the foreman say, 'XYZ is not guilty.' And I'm not talking about proving a guilty man not guilty."

As an example, he points to the recent highly publicized "Los Siete" case in which seven young Mexican-Americans were charged with murdering a police officer during a scuffle in San Francisco's Mission District. Mr. Lipset was hired by the defense's chief attorney, Charles Garry, after the lawyer received an anonymous phone call from a woman in Fresno, Calif., casting doubt on the account of the incident given by the dead officer's partner.

Tracing down telephone and other records, Mr. Lipset discovered the woman was an ex-wife of the partner—a woman who the defense previously didn't know existed. After several months, he traced her to a restaurant in the High Sierras where she worked as a waitress. She offered key testimony for the defense as to the partner's habits that apparently helped damage the prosecution's case. The prolonged trial ended with an acquittal.

Criminal investigation, Mr. Lipset says, is like "a jigsaw puzzle. If you're a good investigator and a piece doesn't fit, you go to another. But if you're a bad investigator, you file down the pieces until they do fit." What he considers "my best investigative case" not only allowed him to test his detection abilities, but also apply skills in what has become his trademark: Electronic snooping.

In the case, the client was himself a prosecutor, William Raggio, long-time district attorney for Reno, Nev. In 1960 Mr. Raggio used a vagrancy charge to arrest a man with a background of arrests on vice charges. The man, feeling he was being harassed, plotted to topple Mr. Raggio by involving him with a teenage girl named Jackie who came to him ostensibly to handle her divorce case. (Mr. Raggio was permitted to maintain a private practice on the side.)

Mr. Raggio didn't succumb to the girl's charms. But in a secret meeting with Mr. Raggio, the man told him he would spread the story anyway that Mr. Raggio had indulged in an illicit affair if the vagrancy charge wasn't dropped. What the man didn't know was that Mr. Lipset had been hired by Mr. Raggio and that the private eye had bugged their secret meeting and recorded the threats on tape.

What do we know of this?
H

Mr. Lipset didn't stop with that, however. He ~~also~~ set out to locate the girl and persuade her to testify against the arrested man on an extortion charge. "All I knew was that the girl existed," he relates. "She had given a phony name, address and background. But when people tell a complicated lie, there's usually some truth in it. So, what was the truth in her complicated lie?"

Her story was that she had married a sailor named Newton in San Diego. By checking the Navy Department, Mr. Lipset learned a sailor by that name lived in Northern California. The sailor denied he had ever married a girl named Jackie, but he did say he had once known a girl by that name in Yuba City, Calif. Mr. Lipset then tracked clues from Yuba City to San Diego and finally to San Francisco, where the girl was being held a virtual prisoner by her sister, who was the girlfriend of the man Mr. Raggio had arrested.

Jackie's testimony, along with Mr. Lipset's tape, helped get the man convicted and sentenced to three to five years in prison.

Hal Lipset acquired his first piece of electronic equipment, a wire recorder, in 1948. He has made extensive use of such gear ever since. True Detective magazine once called him "the maestro of electronic private detection," and around San Francisco he's known as a "private ear" as well as a "private eye." A ~~Gefman~~ magazine once dubbed him "der super schniffer," or the super snooper.

Mr. Lipset keeps some \$25,000 worth of electronic gear on hand at his house for use in cases, and in place of a pistol his shoulder holster packs a \$750, 11-ounce tape recorder. Twice he has been called as an expert witness before U.S. Senate subcommittees investigating listening devices. At a 1965 session he unveiled the bugged martini olive, a gimmick that later surfaced on TV shows, to illustrate what could be accomplished with miniaturization. The device, he acknowledges, "was strictly for show." Since it would only operate for 20 minutes with a range of 40 feet, "it wasn't very practical," he says.

But another gimmick once helped him land a new client. The case involved a department store owner who was interested in setting up a surveillance system at his store to cut down losses suspected to have been the work of employees. But the man didn't believe Mr. Lipset had the technical skill to handle the surveillance.

One day the detective contrived a seemingly chance encounter with the store owner in a Turkish bath. Mr. Lipset was nude and carrying only a bar of soap and an unlit pipe. The store owner kidded him about the pipe, so Mr. Lipset left it outside the steam room.

The next day, he played for the man their complete conversation. The store owner comprehended immediately—the pipe had been bugged. No, Mr. Lipset said with a smile, the pipe had been left outside. The bug was in the soap, which was actually a plastic replica, especially treated to be moisture resistant.

Because of his fondness for the use of electronic devices, Mr. Lipset is unhappy at what he regards as a trend toward circumscribing their use both in wiretaps and in eavesdropping on face-to-face conversations. Since 1968, federal law has generally made any recording inadmissible in court unless one party to the conversation has knowledge of it. But California, which often serves as a legislative proving ground for other states, enacted one of the stiffest prohibitions on the books anywhere a year earlier: no recording unless all parties have knowledge.

"I haven't suffered, but my clients have," Mr. Lipset says. "One of the shortcuts to solving a case has been taken away. What are we interested in? Aren't we interested in the truth?" Those who oppose the use of such devices contend, however, that there are other ways of getting at the truth without engaging in what they consider to be an invasion of privacy.

In arguing for the use of secret recordings, he ticks off a string of cases in which his recorder, he believes, helped make the difference. Once, for instance, he was hired by a movie producer slapped with a paternity suit. Mr. Lipset followed the woman plaintiff around Europe until finally, in France, he got her to admit (to a secret recorder) that the suit was a phony against a "sucker."

No Argument With Morality

In another case, on behalf of a manufacturer losing thousands of dollars worth of contracts to bids only a few dollars lower, Mr. Lipset bugged the company phones and turned up an employee who was passing planned bids on to a rival concern that, in turn, was undercutting Mr. Lipset's client.

One of Mr. Lipset's chief objections to both the federal law and the California law is that they exempt law enforcement agencies from the eavesdropping prohibitions. "I couldn't argue with the morality (of either law) as long as they applied to everybody," Mr. Lipset says. "But once you except law enforcement, I have to stand and fight." The police, he argues, "should have no right above the normal person."

As for the danger that a recording might be edited to distort the meaning of a person's statements, Mr. Lipset says modern techniques make it possible to detect any such editing.

Upset as he is about restrictions on electronic snooping, Mr. Lipset says it hasn't hurt his agency's business. He says increased "debugging" work—checking offices and plants for listening devices—has more than replaced the lost bugging business.

Another recent California law—a divorce reform measure—has been singled out by many private eyes as a bigger threat to their livelihoods than the antieavesdropping law. The divorce law now makes it possible to dissolve a marriage without requiring either party to bring to court all the elaborate evidence of adultery or other misbehavior that formerly was required. Mr. Lipset figures he'll continue to get some divorce cases, however. "People want to know the truth themselves," he says.

In his time, Mr. Lipset has kicked in his share of doors, photographer at his side, to collect divorce evidence. He recalls that a wealthy man once hired him to investigate his wife, who had taken up with a municipal bus driver in San Francisco. Mr. Lipset tracked them to a hotel room, where he and some associates were poised to smash in the door when someone thought to try it first. It was unlocked. They gingerly entered, turned on a light and then set to clicking pictures of the undisturbed couple sleeping.

"We pulled back the bed clothes and took another picture," he relates. "We must have had six guys in that room." As they made their way out, "the bus driver opened one eye and said, 'Would you mind turning off the light?'"

An Emotional Stress

Some detectives dismiss divorce cases as "gutter" business, but Mr. Lipset doesn't mind them. "I have no moral compunctions about divorce cases," he says. But he does have strong feelings against cases involving child custody battles because "they take too much out of me emotionally."

His last one was also his most emotional. "If we get another one with enough scope or money, we'll take it," he says. "But it won't be me who will work on it."

In the last case, Mr. Lipset's client was a mother whose ex-husband had fled illegally with their young son and daughter after a bitter divorce and custody fight. After a two-year search, Mr. Lipset found them in Canada in 1968. If he worked through the courts to get the children, Mr. Lipset reasoned, the father would merely run again. "The only way was to grab the children," Mr. Lipset says. "I had to mount a kidnaping operation. And if we were caught, we'd be fighting in the Canadian courts."

He successfully kidnaped the children and headed for a hiding place where he, his assistant and the mother were to lie low for two days before heading back to the U.S. over back roads. "An investigator friend and I went out for a beer—for a job well done—when we heard the radio report," says Mr. Lipset. "The girl had leukemia and would die without a special medicine. The father had never even let the mother know."

Breaking the News

Mr. Lipset had to break the news to the mother. And as they made a dash back to the U.S., "I had a hysterical mother in the back seat. Tears were coming down her cheeks and tears were coming down mine, too." He says he secured the medicine but won't disclose how he did it, simply asking: "Have you ever tried to buy medicine without a prescription in a foreign country?"

He made it back to the U.S. with the mother and children. The girl died several months later.

Mr. Lipset charges a base fee of \$15 an hour for noncriminal investigations and \$25 for criminal work. Often, a case can stretch out to many hours. "This is a time-consuming business," he says.

One of his fattest fees, however, was \$20,000 netted in the case that whetted his appetite for stolen diamonds, international chases, beautiful women and big rewards. It started on Monday, April 18, 1965, when officials at Shreve & Co., big San Francisco jewelry concern, opened for business and found some 20 pieces worth \$200,000 were missing. Also missing was Irmgard Cross, a beautiful German-born clerk employed by the store.

The Chase Was On

Shreve & Co. hired Mr. Lipset, who quickly learned that the woman's husband, a men's store manager, had also disappeared along with nearly \$1,500 from his employer's safe. Checking airline reservations, the detective further learned that the Crosses had booked passage the preceding Sunday on a plane to Geneva. The chase was on, with the Crosses holding a four-day lead.

Mr. Lipset's odyssey took him to Geneva, Cologne, Paris, Brussels and finally the Canary Islands, where he surprised the couple and, with the help of local police, recovered the jewels 11 days after the theft had been discovered. His job was made easier, he says, by the fact that "they were amateurs" at covering their trail, making such mistakes as renting a car in their own name.

As he closed in, he recalls, "I had to make a decision: I could go knock on the door and say, 'Give me the stuff and I'll let you go free.' I'm not a policeman." But with the stakes involved, he chose to work through the police, having the couple arrested and eventually extradited. "I probably would have just knocked if it had been \$10,000, or \$15,000," he says.

May 3, 1972

REC-101 62-101647-19

X
[redacted]
United Service Detective Bureau, Inc.
Suite 528-530
99 Pratt Street
Hartford, Connecticut 06103

Dear [redacted]

Your letter of April 25th, with enclosures, has been received and I thank you for furnishing your views. With respect to your request, it would not be proper for me to comment as you desire.

b6
b7C

Sincerely yours,

Clyde A. Tolson
Acting Director

Clyde A. Tolson
Acting Director

MAILED 23

MAY 3 - 1972

FBI

NOTE: We wrote [redacted] 10-14-60 concerning [redacted]
[redacted] The study "Private Police in the United States" conducted by Rand Corporation was under the auspices of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration who gave a grant of [redacted] to cover the cost of the study. The purpose was to recommend a basis for standards for the operation and utilization of police auxiliaries and private police agencies and to devise principles for their guidance.

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Gandy _____

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57 MAY 10 1972

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DETECTIVE BUREAU, INC.
99 PRATT ST.
SUITE 528-530
HARTFORD, CONN. 06103
(203) 246-8584



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Confidential Investigations—General Security
April 25, 1972

Mr. John Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C.

Re: "Private Police in the
United States & 4 add-
itional volumes

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Campbell
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Miller, ES
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalby
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Winkart
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

Dear Mr. Hoover:

In the above entitled matter, said five volumes were published by The Rand Corporation as the end report of a 16-month "study" by Sorell Wildhorn & James S. Kakalik and others for The Rand Corporation. Messrs. Wildhorn & Kakalik are also the authors. This "project" was sponsored under Grant No. NI-70-057 by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice of the Department of Justice. If you are familiar with all of what I have just stated, please forgive me this repetitiveness.

A copy of a letter I sent to the NILECJ is attached hereto. I was requested by some of my colleagues to write a "review" of the five volumes, and it is my intention to do so. It is not my intention to be so presumptuous as to ask you for any lengthy opinions regarding the published report by the two gentlemen. Obviously, I shall welcome any comments you might choose to make. However, I have a very serious purpose in writing to you, Mr. Hoover: I, as well as several others I have been in conversation with, in my field, feel deeply that the authors have already done considerable harm in creating the term, "private police" to include private investigators, private security personnel and alarm service personnel.

REC-101

10 APR 27 1972

EXECUTIVE HOME OFFICE—160 BROADWAY, N.Y. 10038
MEMBER: WORLD ASSOCIATION OF DETECTIVES

CORRESPONDENCE

Mr. John Edgar Hoover
Page 2
April 24, 1972

About the last thing we want to become known as is "private police". We find no justification for its use in the titles of the five Rand volumes and throughout each of them (the authors stated that they decided on the term "to enhance the language!"). It is my considered opinion that you would not approve of said term. I hope I am correct. Further, if I am, would you be willing to so state? I think, because of the status of Rand that it will take your personal disapproval to "intercept" said misnomer before it develops common usage.

b6
b7c

P. S. Mr. Hoover, if you'll indulge me a moment longer, I wrote to you 11½ years ago; I have attached a copy of your reply. I value that letter very much. I am still amazed that you took the time, even back then, to answer me in such detail.

Enc. (2)

UNITED SERVICE
DETECTIVE BUREAU, INC.
99 PRATT ST.
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Confidential Investigations—General Security

April 13, 1972

National Institute of Law
Enforcement and Criminal Justice
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C.

Re: The Rand Corporation & Grant NI-70-057

Gentlemen:

In the above entitled matter, I have read "Private Police in the United States" and the four other volumes published by Rand as the end result of the "project", as they refer to it. I have been requested to write a review of the five volumes. Is it possible to obtain from your department a copy of the specifics of said Grant. Also, did they completely fulfill the the Grant requirements?

A matter of concern to the undersigned and to others is the use of the term "private Police" - a term that the authors apparently felt they could lump the various private investigative and security fields under. I am asking if you accept fully the term "private police" or do you feel that the common usage of such a term would be objectionable to the public police forces in general, and confusing to the general public?

Permit me to ask one more question: What is your Department's reaction generally speaking to the five volume report?


62-101647-19
ENCLOSURE

EXECUTIVE HOME OFFICE-160 BROADWAY, N.Y. 10038
MEMBER: WORLD ASSOCIATION OF DETECTIVES

U. S. Department of Justice
April 13, 1972

Page 2

I thank you for your time and look forward to hearing
from you.



b6
b7C



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
October 14, 1960

[Redacted]
Dolan-Whitney Detective Service, Incorporated
44 Vernon Street
Springfield, Massachusetts

Dear [Redacted]

Your letter dated October 10, 1960, inquiring
about [Redacted]

[Redacted]
[Redacted] in the FBI Laboratory. Such
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
On occasion, [Redacted]
[Redacted]

I regret that I am unable to recommend any private
facilities or laboratory for the work you have in mind.
However, [Redacted]
[Redacted]

I trust that the information furnished you in
this letter will be of assistance to you.

Sincerely yours,

J. E. Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

62-101647-19
ENCLOSURE

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B/7/74

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TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: LEGAT, BEIRUT [REDACTED] (P)
SUBJECT: RAND CORPORATION
TERRORISM RESEARCH PROJECT
FOREIGN MISCELLANEOUS

Enclosed for the Bureau are nine copies of a confidential U. S. Department of State Telegram entitled "Terrorism Research Project" and dated 2/4/74, directed to various overseas United States Diplomatic Missions.

The contents of the enclosure sets forth in detail information regarding planned travel of [REDACTED] members of the Rand Corporation for the purpose of conducting a study on behalf of both State and Defense Departments of the United States Government relative to problems with political kidnappings, bargaining process with terrorists holding hostages, etc.

From the enclosure it will be noted that the Rand team is composed of three individuals whose identities

- 3 - Bureau (Encs. - 9)
(1 - Foreign Liaison Unit)
(1 - Legat, Beirut)
(1 - Legat, Bonn)
(1 - Legat, Buenos Aires)
(1 - Legat, London)
(1 - Legat, Mexico City)
(1 - Legat, Tel Aviv)

(10)

REC-91

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ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

58 FEB 26 1974

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[REDACTED]

are disclosed therein and who plan to split their travel abroad. From the enclosure it is noted they will be visiting the following cities on the dates indicated where Legal Attache personnel are located: Buenos Aires 2/24/74, and 3/1/74; Beirut 3/1/74; Brasilia 3/13 and 3/15/74; Tel Aviv 3/8/74; Mexico City 3/17 (Guadalajara 3/20/74); Bonn 3/21/74, and London 3/26/74.

While enclosure indicates the Rand team will talk to political officers, security officers, Public Safety officials and do not mention contacting Legats, it is possible in some instances they may attempt to contact Legats.

DACH, if contacted, Legat intends politely to indicate to team member contacting him that Legat's liaison responsibilities with [REDACTED] does not encompass area of Rand Corporation study.

b7D

The Bureau may desire to furnish enclosures to designated Legats with appropriate comments.

Enclosure

62-101647-20

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

INCOMING

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

3. COUNTRIES CHOSEN FOR FIELD RESEARCH HAVE ALL EXPERIENCED KIDNAPPING PROBLEMS. IN SEVERAL, ALTHOUGH DIPLOMATS HAVE NOT ALWAYS BEEN TARGETS, KIDNAPPINGS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, FOREIGN BUSINESSMEN, ETC.) HAVE CONTINUED. THE RESEARCHERS WILL NATURALLY WANT TO TALK WITH POLITICAL AND SECURITY OFFICERS AND DEFENSE ATTACHES AT EACH POST, AS WELL AS AID PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICIALS WHERE AVAILABLE. THEY WILL RELY ON EMBASSY/CONSULATE TO PROVIDE APPROPRIATE GUIDANCE RE WHICH LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS THEY SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT SEE, AND WHAT APPROACH THEY SHOULD TAKE IN EACH CASE.

4. SUBJECT MATTER IS, OF COURSE, SENSITIVE. IT IS THUS NECESSARY THAT RESEARCHERS' VISITS BE HANDLED WITH UTMOST DISCRETION. RAND CORPORATION HAS ITSELF ASKED DEPARTMENT TO EMPHASIZE THIS POINT. THE RESEARCHERS MAY BE PRESENTED TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AS MEMBERS OF PRIVATE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING RESEARCH FOR USG; THEIR DISCUSSIONS SHOULD BE REGARDED THEREFORE AS INFORMAL AND UNOFFICIAL. LOW-KEY APPROACH WITH A FEW LOCAL OFFICIALS WHOSE DISCRETION CAN BE RELIED UPON IS CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE. RAND PREFERS THAT ITS ASSOCIATION WITH PROJECT REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL AND NOT BE REVEALED PUBLICLY.

5. THE [REDACTED] INDIVIDUALS CONDUCTING THE FIELD RESEARCH ARE: (1) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WHO WILL BE TRAVEL-
ING TO [REDACTED] (2) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WHO WILL BE TRAVEL-
ING TO [REDACTED] AND (3) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WHO WILL BE
TRAVELING TO [REDACTED]

6. POSTS ARE REQUESTED TO GIVE RESEARCHERS FULLEST APPROPRIATE SUPPORT IN THIS SURVEY, WHICH IS EXPECTED TO LEAD TO GUIDELINES FOR POTENTIAL HOSTAGES AS WELL AS FOR THOSE NEGOTIATING THEIR RELEASE.

7. TENTATIVE ITINERARY OF RESEARCHERS FOLLOWS: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

8. RESEARCHERS WILL INFORM POSTS OF MORE SPECIFIC ETA'S, HOTELS, ETC. COMMENT TO DEPARTMENT SHOULD BE SLUGGED FOR S/CCT AND INR. [REDACTED]

BT

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TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

INCOMING

AMEMBASSY BRASLIA

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6353
RUESBA/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 5270
RUESDO/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 8936
RUFHAU/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 5304
RUESUP/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 3808
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0552
RUEHCR/AMCONSUL MONTREAL 3152
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 2020
RUESAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 5135
RUESGT/AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA 5117
RUESAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 9399
RUESBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 2595
RUESMO/AMCONSUL GUADALAJARA 1095
RUESGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 5179
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1661
INFO RUESJR/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 4712

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 023142

~~E.O. 11652: ADS, DECLASS 274/82~~

TAGS: PINS

SUBJECT: TERRORISM RESEARCH PROJECT

REF: A-6840, AUGUST 8, 1973

1. AS ANNOUNCED IN REFERENCE A, AN INDEPENDENT RESEARCH ORGANIZATION HAS BEEN CONTRACTED BY DEPARTMENT, IN COOPERATION WITH DEFENSE, TO CONDUCT THOROUGH STUDY OF PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL KIDNAPPING, INCLUDING THE BARGAINING PROCESS WITH TERRORISTS' HOLDING HOSTAGES. THAT STUDY, NOW IN PROGRESS, WILL COVER FOUR MAIN ASPECTS: (1) EXTERNAL FACTORS; (2) EXPERIENCES OF HOSTAGES; (3) POSSIBLE APPLICATIONS OF TECHNOLOGY; AND (4) IMPROVEMENT IN U.S. HANDLING OF SUCH INCIDENTS. VEHICLE FOR GATHERING INFORMATION ON THESE FOUR ASPECTS IS SERIES OF APPROXIMATELY 20 CASE STUDIES OF BARGAINING SITUATIONS, WHICH INCLUDE BOTH U.S. AND FOREIGN OFFICIALS, CIVILIAN AND MILITARY OFFICIALS, AND OFFICIALS IN BOTH UNKNOWN AND "BARRICADE" SITUATIONS. PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF STUDY HAVE RECENTLY BEEN BRIEFED TO WORKING GROUP OF CABINET COMMITTEE TO COMBAT TERRORISM.

2. IN LATE FEBRUARY AND MARCH, MEMBERS OF RAND CORPORATION, WHICH IS CONDUCTING STUDY, WILL BE VISITING VARIOUS POSTS ABROAD. THE RESEARCHERS WILL WANT TO (1) FILL IN SOME OF BLANK SPOTS IN CASE STUDIES, INTERVIEW

FORMER HOSTAGES WHO ARE ASSIGNED ABROAD, AND ASCERTAIN PERCEPTIONS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN EACH EPISODE; (2) DISCUSS CURRENT US ASSESSMENT OF THREAT OF FURTHER KIDNAPPINGS, MEASURES AND CONTINGENCY PLANS THAT HAVE BEEN DRAWN UP, UNDOCUMENTED LEARNING OF US OFFICIALS ABROAD, THEIR UNDERSTANDING AND VIEWS OF CURRENT US POLICY, AND WHERE POSSIBLE, (3) DISCUSS SIMILAR TOPICS WITH OFFICIALS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT.

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U.S. Awards Grant to Rand for Study of Criminal Justice

BY GENE BLAKE

Times Legal Affairs Writer

A concerted effort to determine how the criminal justice system can better serve American society is about to be undertaken with the aid of a federal research grant.

Rand Corp. of Santa Monica has been awarded \$377,438 by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration to develop a practical checklist that courts and prosecutors can use to evaluate their performance.

Gerald M. Caplan, director of LEAA's research center which will administer the 18-month grant, said the project represents "a bold attempt to develop evaluation standards for the efficiency of courts and prosecutors and the fairness and quality of justice that is being dispensed."

Charles R. Work, deputy director of LEAA, a Justice Department agency which channels federal funds to help improve law enforcement systems, said: "The emphasis is on practicality. Criteria will be developed for specific types of courts that take into consideration each court's particular resources and responsibilities."

It is believed that such precise measures also will permit comparisons of performance in various jurisdictions and lay the foundation for a national assessment of the state of criminal courts and prosecuting agencies.

Caplan said the performance measures will address such qualitative issues as the amount of time and effort prosecutors spend preparing cases, the training judges and prosecutors receive and the treatment given witnesses and jurors.

The first phase of the Rand study is intended to produce the performance measures. To this end, interviews will be conducted with judges, court administrators, prosecutors, defense lawyers and law professors.

However, the attitudes and perceptions of court users also will be surveyed. Interviews will be conducted with a total of 300 victims, witnesses and defendants, as well as 300 members of the general public in three court jurisdictions.

"This is a crucial component of the research," Caplan said. "It will ensure that performance measures reflect not just the perspective of criminal justice practitioners but the frequently ignored needs of citizens."

The three court jurisdictions to be surveyed have not yet been selected.

A second, demonstration phase will test the validity and usefulness of the performance measures by placing them in use in two court jurisdictions.

Heading the project for Rand will be Sorrel Wildhorn, who also has worked on a year-long analysis of what happens to adult felony defendants in Los Angeles County. The report, released last year, raised "grave doubts as to the consistency or equity with which defendants are treated."

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Director Sec'y _____

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The Washington Post _____
Washington Star-News _____
Daily News (New York) _____
The New York Times _____
The Wall Street Journal _____
The National Observer _____
The Los Angeles Times **PAKTH-1**

Date **JUL 29**

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STATE 086

11:30 AM ROUTINE 2-22-74 JN

TO DIRECTOR

BUFILE

FROM LEGAT BUENOS AIRES

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

1974 R. 034

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Director's Sec'y _____

ARAB TERRORIST ACTIVITIES, IS - MIDDLE EAST.

Rand Corporation

REBUAIRTEL FEBRUARY 7, 1974.

PROTECTION OF AMERICAN CITIZENS AND U. S. GOVERNMENT

EMPLOYEES IN ARGENTINA IS BASICALLY A CONCERN OF THE U.S.

STATE DEPARTMENT THROUGH THEIR CONSULAR OFFICIALS, HOWEVER,

AMBASSADOR HILL, U. S. EMBASSY, BUENOS AIRES, FREQUENTLY

CALLS ON THIS LEGAT FOR ASSISTANCE IN BRIEFING HIM AND OTHER

U. S. OFFICIALS ON THE TERRORIST SITUATION. HE AND OTHER

EMBASSY OFFICERS HAVE REFERRED TO THE RAND STUDY GROUP COMING

TO BUENOS AIRES, AND HAVE INDICATED THEY WOULD EXPECT THIS

LEGAT TO GIVE THEM INFORMATION REGARDING CURRENT TERRORIST

ACTIVITIES AS WELL AS DIRECTION TOWARDS POLICE SOURCES THAT

MIGHT BE OF ASSISTANCE TO THEM. THIS IS INFORMATION THAT

COMES TO THIS OFFICE ON A REGULAR BASIS IN THE COURSE OF OUR

OFFICIAL LIAISON RESPONSIBILITIES.

END PAGE ONE

ans. by cable to

[Redacted]

2/22/74

[Redacted]

70 MAR 5 1974

62-101647-51

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165 MAR 4 1974

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PAGE TWO

IT IS BELIEVED THAT OUR EXCELLENT RELATIONSHIP WITH THE AMBASSADOR AND OTHER EMBASSY OFFICERS COULD BE SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZED IF THIS OFFICE WOULD DECLINE TO GIVE LIMITED ASSISTANCE IN A GENERAL BRIEFING OF THE RAND GROUP.

IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THIS OFFICE BE PERMITTED TO FURNISH THIS GROUP WITH GENERAL INTELLIGENCE OBTAINED FROM SOURCES REGARDING POLITICAL KIDNAPPINGS, AS WELL AS TO GIVE THEM DIRECTIONS TOWARDS CORRECT POLICE OFFICIALS WHO SHOULD BE CONTACTED FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.

MOST OF THE INTELLIGENCE IN THIS MATTER HAS NOT BEEN THE SUBJECT FOR REPORTING TO THE BUREAU BUT HAS COME TO THE ATTENTION OF THIS OFFICE IN CONNECTION WITH OUR REGULAR POLICE LIAISON AND IS RELATED ONLY TO ARGENTINE TERRORISTS. IT HAS NO CONNECTION WITH ARAB TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.

UACB, INFORMATION OF THE TYPE REFERRED TO ABOVE WILL BE SUBMITTED TO THE RAND CORPORATION REPRESENTATIVES.

END.

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The RAND Corporation
1700 MAIN STREET
SANTA MONICA, CALIFORNIA 90406

REQUEST FOR REPORT

TO: Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation
US Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20535

The document listed below is requested for use in connection with studies being conducted by the Rand Corporation, an independent, nonprofit organization engaged entirely in research and analysis on problems of the public welfare and the security of the United States. Its work centers on issues of policy and planning and on fundamental research in both foreign and domestic affairs.

Please address correspondence to:

The Rand Corporation
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, California 90406

Attn: Library 98

Authorized signature _____

Please return one copy of this form with your reply or refer to
Request No. 74-877 Date 11 June 74

If report is not available gratis, please inform us before forwarding.

REPORT NO.	TITLE	AUTHOR OR ISSUING AGENCY	DATE	CLASSIFICATION
	<u>TERRORISM - ITS TACTICS & TECHNIQUES.</u> <i>calif</i>	FBI, Dept. of Justice	12 Jan 73	Uncl. b6 b7C

Requested for: Retention XXX Loan _____
Remarks:

REPLY:

- ☐ Enclosed ☐ for retention ☐ for loan period of _____
☐ Forwarded under separate cover **REC-73**
☐ Report is being reproduced; it will be forwarded upon completion of reproduction.
☐ Not yet published; to be forwarded about _____
☐ Not yet published; please resubmit request about _____ days.
☐ Not available through this office; forward request to: _____
☐ For sale. Price _____

Remarks:

PLEASE ATTACH ONE COPY OF THIS
REQUEST TO MATERIAL WHEN TRANSMITTED

By: _____
Date: 6/18/74

June 2, 1977

OUTSIDE SOURCE

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Rand Corporation
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, California 90406

Dear [redacted]

With reference to the research studies of Rand Corporation on "terrorism", I am requesting certain information which is of considerable interest to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

I would appreciate it if you would forward copies of both the classified and unclassified studies to the FBI Bomb Data Program, 9th and Pennsylvania Avenue, Room 1427, Washington, D. C. 20535, Attention: SA [redacted]

Your cooperation is indeed appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

G. M. Kelley

REC-105

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

62-101647-22

JUN 3 1977

- 1 - Mr. Moore
Attention: Mr. Mignosa
- 1 - Mr. McNeely

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
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Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Serv.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

NOTE: At a convention of the International Association of Bomb Technicians and Investigators held in Miami, Florida, 5/9-13/77, [redacted] Rand Corporation, advised SA [redacted] that he would be happy to furnish both classified and unclassified research studies conducted by his agency on the topic "terrorism". He stated he desired a letter from the Director as a matter of record for this request.

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MAILED 10

JUN 2 1977

FBI

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

FBI/DOJ

December 31, 1975

62-101647-

[Redacted]
The Rand Corporation
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, California 90406

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Dear [Redacted]

Reference is made to your letter dated December 9, 1975, in which you requested an edited copy of the Computerized Criminal History File.

A number of questions have arisen concerning the scope of this project which my staff will attempt to resolve through contact with the [Redacted]. Upon completion of our findings, we will contact you directly regarding your request.

Sincerely yours,

S. M. Kelley
Clarence M. Kelley
Director

- (4)
1 - Mr. Decker
1 - Mr. Buell

NOTE: See Buell to Decker memo dated 12/30/75, captioned "The Rand Corporation: Request for Edited Copy of the Computerized Criminal History (CCH) File," [Redacted]

MAILED 7
DEC 31 1975
FBI

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Dep. AD Adm.
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Director Sec'y

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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Director Sec'y _____

TO : Mr. Decker *ADD/eh*

DATE: 12/30/75

FROM : F. B. Buell *FB/BA*

SUBJECT: THE RAND CORPORATION: REQUEST FOR EDITED
COPY OF THE COMPUTERIZED CRIMINAL HISTORY (CCH) FILE

PURPOSE:

By letter dated 12/9/75 (attached), [redacted] Rand Corporation, requested an edited copy of the CCH File for use in a criminal justice research project. The purpose of this memorandum is to discuss the request and to recommend that the Bureau obtain more information concerning the Rand project before making any support commitment.

BACKGROUND:

In his letter, [redacted] advised that the CCH information will be used in an ongoing study of violent habitual offenders which is being supported by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, an LEAA-funded institute. Stated goals for the program include a better definition of the habitual offender, obtaining an estimate of the number of such individuals, and the measurement of the amount of crime for which they are responsible.

[redacted] stated that CCH data will help them trace and characterize criminal careers within which violent and potentially violent offenses occur. The information they request is to be edited to remove the name and other unique identifiers of the offender as well as the name of the arresting agency.

The NCIC CCH Background, Concept and Policy document provides for the use of CCH data for research purposes providing that provisions have been made in the project's design to ensure personal privacy by divorcing the identification of subjects from the data. The policy document also calls for the review of such projects by NCIC or a control terminal agency to assure their propriety and to determine that proper security is being provided.

Enclosures (2)
1 - Mr. Decker (encs.)
1 - Mr. Buell (encs.)

(3)

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Memo F. B. Buell to Mr. Decker
Re: The Rand Corporation: Request for
Edited Copy of CCH File

Conceptually, the utilization of CCH data for criminal justice research is an important system application. However, from a practical standpoint, the Bureau must carefully evaluate each potential application to prevent the system from being inundated with such requests. The Bureau's evaluation of a project's "propriety" should eliminate all except well-founded studies conducted by recognized criminal justice researchers, thereby justifying the costs to the Bureau both in terms of manpower and computer "time."

It is, therefore, recommended that the Bureau obtain additional information concerning this project from the project's sponsor. Following a staff review of the project, a decision should then be made as to what degree of assistance we can render. The attached proposed letter to [redacted] advises him that the Bureau will obtain project details from the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice for additional study prior to making a decision as to whether an edited copy of the CCH File can be provided by the Bureau to assist them in their study.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached letter be forwarded to [redacted]

sent 12/31/75

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4
December 9, 1975

Clarence M. Kelly, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20535

Dear Mr. Kelly:

The purpose of this communication is to request an edited copy of your Computerized Criminal History file.

The data are requested for use in an ongoing study of violent habitual offenders, conducted within the Criminal Justice Program under the direction of [redacted] of The Rand Corporation. The study is being supported by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice [redacted]

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Our study may be briefly described by the following:

Overall Program Strategy

Objectives - Establish an interdisciplinary group of researchers, who will develop unique capabilities and expertise for dealing with the problems of identification, prosecution, and rehabilitation of the dangerous criminal offender.

- 62-101647-
101 JAN 16 3/8
- Produce extensive research into the definition and the characteristics of habitual offenders, their behavior patterns, and the problems associated with prosecution and treatment. The findings of such research will be available to address major policy issues.

Because of the lack of previous work dealing with the dangerous habitual offender, initial research will primarily be exploratory in nature. The goals set for the end of the two-year grant period are to have:

- ENCLOSURE
7 JAN 13 1976
- (a) compiled a comprehensive review of all relevant previous research literature;
 - (b) developed a practical habitual offender definition by using data routinely collected by criminal justice agencies;

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- (c) estimated the number of such habitual offenders and the amount of crime for which they are responsible;
- (d) developed a profile of several types of habitual offenders, including their characters, behavior, and reactions to criminal justice programs;
- (e) developed a realistic estimate of the way criminal justice agencies can be expected to treat such offenders;
- (f) reviewed innovative identification, prosecution, and treatment programs for the habitual offender.

Data are required which will enable us to trace and characterize careers within which violent and potentially violent offenses occur, such as robbery and assault; and for these purposes the published UCR data are not sufficient. We also are seeking data for the Departments of Correction of California, Florida, Colorado and several other states, in order to fulfill our data requirements.

We would appreciate your providing an edited copy of the CCH file, edited to remove the name and other unique identifiers of the offender, as well as the name of the arresting agency. (However, we would like to know the State in which the arrest took place.)

Sincerely,



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July 12, 1977

OUTSIDE SOURCE

The Rand Corporation
1700 Main Street
Santa Barbara, California 90406

Dear [redacted]

The studies you sent to the FBI Bomb Data Program have been received. They will be of substantial assistance to us in that program and also in our Terrorist Research Program.

Publications of this nature ease our task of assembling information which will be useful in any efforts to reduce incidents of terrorism. I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely yours,

C. M. Kelley
Clarence M. Kelley
Director

- 1 - Mr. Moore
- 1 - Mr. Ingram
- 1 - Mr. Mignosa

REC-64

DE-51 112
62-101647-23

NOTE: By letter from the Director dated 6/2/77, [redacted] was asked to provide a number of Rand Corporation studies to the FBI Bomb Data Program.

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Dep. AD Inv. _____
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Director's Sec'y _____

APPROVED:

Director _____
Asst. Dir. _____
[redacted] _____

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Telephone Rm. _____

23 JUL 18 1977

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56 MAIL ROOM [redacted] TELETYPE UNIT []

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Mr. Paul R. Michel
Associate Deputy Attorney General

Francis M. Mullen, Jr.
Assistant Director
Criminal Investigative Division

1 - Mr. L. Colwell
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. F. M. Mullen, Jr.
December 26, 1979

RAND CORPORATION PROPOSED STUDY
"THE IMPACT OF NEW INTELLIGENCE
RULES ON INVESTIGATIVE EFFECTIVENESS
AGAINST TERRORIST AND RELATED CRIMES"

1 - Mr. K. E. Joseph
(Attn: Mr. Lacey)
1 - Mr. S. S. Mignosa
1 - Mr. G. E. McNeely

Reference is made to telephone conversation between Mr. Michel and Mr. S. S. Mignosa, when Mr. Michel requested FBI comments on captioned proposed study.

A copy of captioned study was made available to Mr. Mignosa by [redacted] Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), on December 5, 1979. [redacted] advised that a grant had been given to the Rand Corporation for this study. It is the FBI's position that the grant for captioned study should have been cleared with the FBI or the Department of Justice (DOJ) prior to it being granted and that if the study is to go forward, the FBI should be part of any meetings held to possibly redefine the scope of the study.

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In regard to comments of the FBI requested by Mr. Michel concerning this study, the following are submitted:

Approving of this study by LEAA without FBI or DOJ concurrence is discouraging inasmuch as the study, as proposed, should not go forward without FBI and DOJ input.

It is noted the range of the study as proposed is somewhat broad since it covers current and proposed statutes relative to terrorism, all the various guidelines that affect the investigation of terrorism matters, as well as Freedom of Information-Privacy matters.

16 DEC 31 1979

The study would somehow compare investigations of the 1960's versus those of today and attempt to measure perception of individuals conducting investigations.

ENCLOSURE

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

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FBI
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs.
Crim. Inv.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

68 FEB 6

MAIL ROOM

Mr. Paul R. Michel

One of the techniques necessary in successful completion of an investigation is informants. In order for the Rand Corporation to conduct the proposed study they would need access to informants. As you are aware the FBI could not give Rand Corporation access to informants and/or informant files since this could jeopardize our informants or give the perception of jeopardizing informants. It is noted that Rand Corporation would also have to look at informant guidelines and this matter is currently under study. Additionally, it appears to the FBI that this study would be duplicative of two previous General Accounting Office reports, current hearings on the Hill, as well as activities of various oversight committees.

For the above reasons it is requested that members of my Staff be available as mentioned above, to take part in any meeting with Rand Corporation concerning the captioned study.

NOTE:

Mr. Michel indicated a ^ΦRand Corporation representative would be in Washington, D. C. on or about 1/11/80 for discussion of captioned grant.

IV. Project Narrative

THE IMPACT OF NEW INTELLIGENCE RULES ON
INVESTIGATIVE EFFECTIVENESS AGAINST TERRORIST
AND RELATED CRIMES

AUGUST 1979

SUBMITTED TO: LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION

THE RAND CORPORATION
1700 MAIN STREET
SANTA MONICA, CALIFORNIA 90406

212
62-101647-24

ENCLOSURE

THE IMPACT OF NEW INTELLIGENCE RULES ON INVESTIGATIVE EFFECTIVENESS
AGAINST TERRORIST AND RELATED CRIMES

INTRODUCTION

"There was a time when you knew what was going to happen." This remark was made by one of the police officers surrounding the West German consulate in Chicago on August 17, 1978. Inside, two armed Croatian extremists were holding eight persons hostage and demanding to communicate with another Croatian extremist held in West Germany for the murder of a Yugoslav diplomat.

The officer's comment is a common one. Law enforcement officials have complained that new rules on intelligence collection and retention have seriously impaired their ability to anticipate possible terrorist incidents or to identify, locate, and apprehend those who have engaged in politically-motivated crimes. For example, Stuart Knight, Director of the U.S. Secret Service, testified before the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures that there had been a 50-60 percent fall-off in the intelligence which his agency was receiving, and that the qualitative degradation might account for a further 25 percent reduction in intelligence input.* But have these increasing restrictions, in fact, impaired law enforcement's effectiveness against terrorism and related crimes?

It is true that following the revelations of abuses by government agencies collecting intelligence, increasing controls and limitations have been placed on the intelligence operations of law enforcement agencies at the federal, state, and local levels. These rules limit inquiry, surveillance, or keeping files on certain persons or organizations; establish criteria for the use of certain intelligence-gathering techniques, for example, electronic surveillance; limit the

**The Erosion of Law Enforcement Intelligence and its Impact on the Public Security*, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Part 1, 95th Congress, First Session, July 27, 1977.

time information can be retained in government files; restrict the transfer of information from one agency of government to another; in some cases compel government agencies maintaining certain categories of information to routinely report what they have in their files, or reveal it to the subject upon request, and establish oversight groups and procedures to insure compliance. The rules are set forth in federal legislation, Executive Orders, department, agency, and service directives, state legislation, guidelines at the local level, and individual court rulings.

For example, congressional initiatives of the last decade mirror concerns regarding unwarranted surveillance and disclosure, privacy and security, and information practices, among others. Legislation that impacts on this area includes the *Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968* (P.L. 90-351, 18 U.S.C. 2511 *et seq.*), the *Crime Control Act of 1973* (P.L. 93-53, 87 Stat. 197 [42 U.S.C. 3711 *et seq.*]), the *Privacy Act of 1974* (P.L. 93-579, 5 U.S.C. 552), the *Freedom of Information Act* (F.O.I.A.) (P.L. 93-502, as amended, 5 U.S.C. 522), and the *Foreign Surveillance Act* (P.L. 95-511).

Although most of the new rules have been enacted at the federal level, these often have a direct and indirect effect at the state and local levels, for example, the new rules aimed at the handling of criminal history records. The Department of Justice set forth regulations (40 Federal Register 22114, as amended 41 Federal Register 11714) requiring that criminal history records handling practices be instituted to ensure security and privacy. The regulations require each State to prepare and submit to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) a security and privacy information plan for criminal history records. The governor of each State designates the agency responsible for the implementation of the regulations. After submission and approval of a plan, the State certifies compliance or a schedule for future implementation.

Different offices and services within government agencies and departments may interpret presidential and departmental directives somewhat differently. Beyond the rules themselves, there is a new atmosphere governing intelligence activities. In the wake of criminal

prosecution of government officials for illegal intelligence activities and today's seemingly greater likelihood of exposure, senior and middle level bureaucrats may have become cautious beyond the letter of the new rules in authorizing intelligence operations for fear of getting into trouble over the slightest infraction, or what may be regarded as an infraction. In an effort to avoid repetition of certain past abuses, proportionately less weight may have been attached to adverse effects the new legislation and directives might have. Revelations of abuses during the Vietnam War and in the immediate post-Watergate atmosphere made it hard to argue against the proposed rules.

No assessment has as yet been made of the effects of the new rules individually or, more importantly, of their overall effect. (A preliminary assessment made by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board in 1976 was mainly prospective, and is classified.) But some side effects can already be observed. The volume and type of Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act requests were unanticipated; government agencies have been compelled to devote considerable manpower and money processing them. Some intelligence files have been destroyed to preclude their possible release. The "soft file" which is inaccessible under FOIA is increasingly used by intelligence-collecting agencies. Some law enforcement officials are maintaining their own intelligence files "in the trunk of their car," or keeping in their head what can no longer officially be recorded on paper -- a rough-and-ready strategy that maintains a minimally-effective capability so long as memories last and personnel are not rotated, but that may not permit a law enforcement agency to make the most effective use of their investigative resources. Private intelligence organizations have increased, financed by corporations whose fears of terrorism (although not currently a major threat in this country) have grown at the same time that confidence in the ability of law enforcement to anticipate and prevent terrorist attack has declined.

The fundamental question, however, is whether the new rules impose unintended and unwarranted restrictions on essential intelligence activities. The fundamental problem is how to

make such an assessment without getting trapped into an unproductive philosophical debate about the role of intelligence in a free society, or the perceived conflict between the preservation of civil liberties on the one hand and the intelligence activities necessary for the legitimate suppression or least containment of terrorist violence and the protection of national security information on the other.

It seems useful to set aside debate about broad philosophical issues and instead look at the record, with emphasis on terrorism and politically motivated crimes. Would the new rules, if then operative, have precluded use of the intelligence methods involved in past cases? And would that have led to failure in cases that were successful? The past successes to be examined would comprise those cases where the perpetrators were brought to trial and convicted or expelled, or where possibly a crime was prevented due to successful vigilance. We would then want to examine the intelligence techniques used to successfully prevent a crime or identify and apprehend perpetrators, or gather evidence for conviction. In other words, we would examine what really worked: informants, infiltration, electronic or other forms of surveillance. In the final step, we would look at the new rules to determine whether and to what extent certain methods of investigation and surveillance that have proved successful in the past can no longer be used. Thus, our objective is to try to provide a *factual* basis for assessing the overall effect of the new rules.

Without prejudging the conclusions of the proposed research effort, one of several outcomes is possible. Such an assessment may suggest that intelligence-gathering *has* been seriously hampered by the new rules; techniques that have been employed successfully before can no longer be used. It is possible that intelligence activities have been hampered, but the probabilities of identifying and apprehending criminals and terrorists before they act is so low to begin with that the effect is marginal. It is possible that the things that worked before *have not* been affected substantially by the new rules. It is also possible that certain effective practices used in the past that were not legal in the strictest sense of the word have now been abandoned, not because legislation or regulation has changed but because an atmosphere of greater caution prevails. Finally, it is

also possible that the proposed research may be inconclusive with regard to the effect of the new rules because of lack or inaccessibility of suitable data or because many cases are so murky that no conclusion can be reached.

RESEARCH APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

Given that our main objective is to provide as solid a *factual* basis as possible for assessing the impact of the new intelligence rules, we envision a research effort which would

- o Assemble the new rules to obtain a comprehensive picture;
- o Define the crimes and/or intelligence activities upon which the research will focus;
- o Identify types of past "successes" and determine the techniques involved in them;
- o Select the sample of past successful cases to be examined in detail;
- o Examine the selected case sample to determine whether the new rules would have had some impact;
- o Possibly select recent cases which have not been prosecuted and determine whether they might have been successfully prosecuted without the new rules. Also, possibly identify past "failures" under the old rules in which information could not be used or techniques were prohibited;
- o Synthesize results and determine whether and to what extent the new rules have had an impact.

Below we describe each task briefly.

Task 1: Assemble the Relevant Rules

To obtain a comprehensive picture of the new rules, relevant federal legislation, Executive Orders, department directives (including relevant classified directives and regulations), and samples of state legislation and local guidelines will be assembled. The sponsor will furnish necessary research material within its control, and facilitate the acquisition of other appropriate information. A visual

display might depict the flow of intelligence from techniques of collection to ultimate use in apprehension and prosecution, showing how the rules affect this flow. The completion of this task could provide a basis for interim reporting.

Task 2: Define the Scope of the Research

Definition is to be a primary research task. It can be approached from two angles, and we propose to explore both. First, what *activities* do the new rules attempt to prevent: keeping files, disclosing information, infiltration, certain kinds of surveillance, ability to deny an entry visa, and so on? We realize that the new rules were implemented to allow greater public access to government, to preserve privacy, and to prevent specific abuses. But their effect is either to make it more difficult to employ certain techniques of investigation and collection of information or to prohibit them entirely.

The definition issue will also be approached from another angle. On what categories of *crime* do they impact? And what categories should be included in the research? It is clear that the areas of terrorist incidents, sabotage, nuclear extortion, and other "politically motivated crimes" should be included. (We propose to *exclude* the crime of espionage but not transnational aspects of terrorism.) But what does this mean in terms of actual crimes? How do investigators and prosecutors define this universe? Should the universe be defined on the basis of political motivation? And how does one judge political motivation -- on the basis of conspiracies rather than individual crimes? Or, does one define it on the basis of national security impact? Perhaps looking at the definition issue through crime characteristics may be somewhat misleading, since some of the rules were intended to affect the use of certain techniques in episodes where crime had not yet been committed.

Task 3: Identify Types of Past Successes and Techniques Employed

As essential background for the research, we propose to interview federal and local law enforcement officials with experience in

intelligence operations. Federal agencies would include the FBI, the Secret Service, and military intelligence organizations. Two or three local police departments, such as Los Angeles, New York, Miami, Washington, D.C. -- areas of traditional political dissidence and violence -- would be included to determine the direct and indirect effects federal rules may have on local police investigations. Rules have been established by some state legislatures and local police commissions; in many cases these were profoundly influenced by the new rules established at the federal level.

The purpose of the interviews is to identify the characteristics of the past successes and the techniques associated with them. In addition, we would determine the impact of the new rules as seen by responsible officials and their responses to them. To obtain different perspectives we propose to interview prosecutors and possibly judges. It may also be appropriate in certain kinds of cases to interview defense attorneys to obtain a very different kind of perspective. We realize that each of these actors has his own vested interests and hence his own unique perspective. But we will attempt to overcome this by careful case selection.

Task 4: Selection of the Case Sample

The selection and analysis of the case sample is the heart of the proposed research, since this will test our ability to provide a factual basis for the assessment of the new rules. We fully realize that case selection presents a problem. Limited resources will preclude selecting and analyzing a large random sample. Even if resources were unlimited, it might be difficult to take a random sample because, for some case categories, it would be hard to define the universe of cases to be sampled. Media accounts, and particularly our interviews, may produce a biased sample, because in all likelihood some interviewees will suggest cases to illustrate how the new rules have had a deleterious impact. Therefore, proof on the basis of a biased sample may not be proof at all.

Our proposed strategy to overcome this problem is to begin with a few case categories in which we can look at the whole universe or

have a fairly good idea of the whole universe, and then move on to the other categories. Several possibilities exist: specific terrorist group violence or bombing campaigns -- NWLF, FALN, WUO, certain right-wing Cuban groups, KKK; threats against the President; nuclear hoaxes; etc. All told, we visualize a sample of about 50 cases, although, depending on availability and analytical resources required per case, the sample size could change as we proceed with the research.

We should stress that access to people and data is crucial to the successful conduct of the proposed study. The study is, of course, contingent upon cooperation from the various federal and local agencies and the people in them.

Task 5: Analysis of the Case Sample

Analysis of the selected case sample would consist of examination of available government case files and court records (where appropriate and economically feasible) and the conduct of additional interviews with investigators, prosecutors and judges and possibly defense attorneys, if appropriate. It would seek to identify the intelligence methods that were used in collection, dissemination and utilization of information. Then, in each case, we would attempt to determine whether and to what extent the new rules would have changed the outcome of the case (prevention of a crime, perpetrator identified, apprehended, convicted, expelled).

Task 6: Possible Supplementary Analysis

Depending on the progress of the research outlined in Tasks 4 and 5, it may be useful to look at additional cases from other sides of the coin, so to speak. Some could be drawn from recent cases not prosecuted to determine whether they might have been successfully prosecuted without the new rules. In effect this category is similar to the basic sample described above, but it may reveal something about the "atmospherics" of the new rules (e.g., whether there was avoidance in using techniques not legally prohibited). And some could be drawn from past failures (prior to the new rules) in which information could not be used or techniques were prohibited. In effect, this category

could afford a comparison between the efficacy or impact of prohibitions before and after the new rules.

We have presented this task as a possibility because it will depend on the cost and the course of the analysis of the basic case sample of past successes. If clear conclusions seem to be in the cards from that analysis, the supplementary analysis may not be needed.

Task 7: Synthesis of Results

Finally, we would bring together and synthesize the essentially anecdotal material from the interviews and media accounts in Tasks 3 and 5 (and possibly 6) with the harder case sample analysis in Task 5 (and possibly Task 6). To repeat our observations in the Introduction: We have not prejudged the outcome of such a study. The conclusions of such an overall assessment are not clear *a priori*; the outcome may be one of several noted.

STAFFING AND SCHEDULING

Staffing

We propose to staff the study with researchers experienced in the fields of terrorism, law, and criminal justice (particularly criminal investigations, prosecution and the courts).

The proposed research will be under the supervision of Brian Jenkins, an historian and Associate Head of Rand's Social Science Department, who has led Rand's work on terrorism since its inception several years ago. The principal investigator will be Sorrel Wildhorn, a senior policy analyst, with considerable experience in criminal justice research. He has directed LEAA-sponsored studies on the private police, public police, and on prosecution, defense and court agencies. In addition, he worked on a study of criminal investigation. His past studies have focused on criminal justice agencies in New York, Los Angeles, and Miami, among other places.

Konrad Kellen also will be a major participant in the project. At present a Rand consultant, he was for 12 years a senior staff member at Rand. He has had extensive experience with terrorism and law

enforcement studies and is a specialist in sociological and political interviewing. Marvin Lavin, a lawyer and a senior Rand analyst for some 20 years, is also at present a Rand consultant. He has had considerable experience in criminal justice research, particularly in studies of criminal careers and prosecution, defense and court agencies. William Harris, an attorney and Rand staff member, was a consultant to the Murphy Commission (1974-75), then to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the law of intelligence (1975-79).

Scheduling

We propose a 15-month study in which the research would be completed in 12 months and the final report prepared in the following three-month period.

Tasks 1, 2, and 3 would be started nearly simultaneously and proceed in parallel. We plan to present the results of Task 1 in the form of an interim report at about the three-month mark. We estimate that Tasks 4 and 5 would begin at about the four-month mark and continue throughout the remainder of the 12 months. As mentioned in the previous section, Task 6 would be contingent on the interim results of the analysis in Task 5.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Assoc. Dir. _____
 Dep. AD Adm. _____
 Dep. AD Inv. _____
 Asst. Dir.:
 Adm. Servs. 1/1
 Crim. Inv. 1/1
 Ident. _____
 Intell. _____
 Laboratory _____
 Legal Coun. _____
 Plan. & Insp. _____
 Rec. Mgnt. _____
 Tech. Servs. _____
 Training _____
 Public Affs. Off. _____
 Telephone Rm. _____
 Director's Sec'y _____

TO : Mr. F. M. Mullen, Jr. *FM/CM*FROM : S. S. Mignosa *Ssm*

SUBJECT: RAND CORPORATION PROPOSED
STUDY "THE IMPACT OF NEW
INTELLIGENCE RULES ON INVESTI-
GATIVE EFFECTIVENESS AGAINST
TERRORISTS AND RELATED CRIMES"

1 - Mr. L. Colwell
 1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
 DATE: 3/3/80
 1 -
 1 - Training Division
 Attn: A. L. Lacey
 1 - Mr. C. P. Monroe
 1 - Mr. S. S. Mignosa
 1 -

PURPOSE: To provide analysis of the captioned study as it would impact upon the FBI's terrorism program and our domestic intelligence activities as they relate to the terrorism program. A copy of this proposal is attached. This memorandum is also intended to advise of a meeting held February 15, 1980, between Associate Deputy Attorney General Robert Keuch, of the Investigation Review Unit of the Department of Justice (DOJ), S. S. Mignosa and of the Criminal Investigative Division, Terrorism Section, and of the Director's Office.

RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that a representative of the Terrorism Section maintain contact with Associate Deputy Attorney General Keuch regarding this matter in order to insure FBI participation in this study, should it proceed as proposed and/or any other similar study should this proposal be rejected by the DOJ.

APPROVED:

Director
 Exec. AD-Inv
 Exec. AD-Adm
 Exec. AD-LES

Adm. Serv.
 Crim. Inv.
 Ident.
 Intell.
 Laboratory
 Legal Coun.
 Plan. & Insp.
 Rec. Mgnt.
 Tech. Servs.
 Training
 Public Affs. Off.

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16 APR 14 1980

ENCLOSURE

Enclosure

64 MAY 6 1980

Memorandum to Mr. F. M. Mullen, Jr.

Re: Rand Corporation Proposed Study "The Impact of New Intelligence Rules on Investigative Effectiveness Against Terrorists and Related Crimes"

DETAILS: By way of background, the proposed study by the Rand Corporation has been funded by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) to make an assessment of whether or not the "new rules" under which law enforcement and intelligence agencies are currently operating have impaired law enforcement's effectiveness against terrorism and related crimes. In the words of [redacted] of this proposed study, the fundamental question "...is whether the new rules impose unintended and unwarranted restrictions on essential intelligence activities." It is assumed that [redacted] is referring to the Attorney General's Domestic Security Guidelines, the FBI Charter and informant guidelines, currently being finalized, when he questions the FBI's ability to adequately function in the prevention of terrorism when he refers to the new rules under which we are operating. [redacted]

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To illustrate [redacted] conceptions and questions about the legal framework under which the FBI is currently operating in the domestic security/terrorism field, he cites numerous examples of local police officers expressing concern over a lack of prior intelligence information which may have enabled the police to prevent a crime from occurring. The often quoted comment of Stuart Knight, Director of the United States Secret Service (USSS), that there has been a 50 to 60 percent fall-off in intelligence data received by his agency, is, of course, quoted again as proof positive that the AG's Guidelines have reduced the ability of the Secret Service to adequately protect the President. What Mr. Knight failed to mention, and [redacted] apparently does not know, is that the Secret Service retained only two percent of all intelligence data submitted to them prior to the establishment of the AG's Guidelines. The vast majority of this data was, of course, furnished by the FBI.

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To resolve the issues raised above, [redacted] proposes to avoid the "...unproductive philosophical debate about the role of intelligence in a free society, or the perceived conflict between preservation of civil liberties on the one hand and the intelligence activities necessary for the legitimate suppression or (at) least containment of terrorist violence and the protection of national security information on the other."

Once these broad philosophical issues are set aside, [redacted] suggests the solution to the perceived problem can be found in looking at the record, with emphasis on

Memorandum to Mr. F. M. Mullen, Jr.

Re: Rand Corporation Proposed Study "The Impact of New Intelligence Rules on Investigative Effectiveness Against Terrorists and Related Crimes"

terrorism and politically motivated crimes, to determine if the new rules, if then operative, would have precluded use of the intelligence methods involved in past cases and would that have led to failure in cases that were successful. To do this, [] proposes to examine 75 to 100 successful cases where the perpetrators were brought to trial and convicted or expelled, or where a crime was prevented due to "successful vigilance." He would then "examine the intelligence techniques used to successfully prevent a crime or identify and apprehend perpetrators or gather evidence for conviction." (Emphasis added.) Specifically, [] intends to study informants, infiltration (assumed to mean undercover operations), and electronic and other forms of surveillances.

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This study was funded by LEAA and a grant given to Rand Corporation at an unknown time in 1979. A copy was first presented to the FBI on December 5, 1979. Neither the DOJ nor the FBI was aware of the proposed study or had any input into the scope of the inquiry or methodology to be used. The approval of this study by LEAA without FBI or DOJ concurrence appears strange since the study, as proposed, could not possibly be conducted without FBI and DOJ assistance.

An examination of the proposed study reveals it to be staggering in its scope since it covers current and proposed statutes and guidelines relative to terrorism, Freedom of Information Act - Privacy Matters, informants, sophisticated technological concepts and undercover operations. The study would somehow compare investigations of the 1960's with those of today. Given the changes in the sociological and legal concepts that have occurred between the 1960's and today, a real concern as to what expertise the Rand Corporation can bring to bear to make subjective judgements concerning these changes is raised. These issues directly relate to the changing and evolving role of the FBI in today's society and nowhere is there evidence in [] proposal that would indicate the Rand Corporation has the expertise to study these issues.

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Memorandum to Mr. F. M. Mullen, Jr.

Re: Rand Corporation Proposed Study "The Impact of New Intelligence Rules on Investigative Effectiveness Against Terrorists and Related Crimes"

Speaking from a purely pragmatic and hopefully practical viewpoint, the study will necessitate extensive interviews of Field Agents throughout the FBI. It will require interviews with Headquarters personnel and access to informants and informant files. This methodology presents extreme, and in all likelihood, insurmountable difficulties. This study would duplicate two previous General Accounting Office (GAO) reports, "FBI Domestic Intelligence Operations--Their Purpose And Scope: Issues That Need To Be Resolved," dated February 24, 1976, and "FBI Domestic Intelligence Operations: An Uncertain Future," dated November 9, 1977, current Congressional hearings, and the activities of various oversight committees. In addition, the guidelines and their impact on the FBI's investigative product undergo continuous evaluation by the FBI and DOJ. To present FBI personnel with yet another study of our basic role in society would create confusion and in many instances, a lack of cooperation.

Access to our informants and/or informant files cannot be granted to Rand Corporation. Without the information contained in these files, an accurate picture of past and current FBI operations would not be possible. Access to our informant files was not given to GAO. Access has been denied Congress, and access would not be given to the Rand Corporation.

On February 5, 1980, a meeting was held between Associate Deputy Attorney General Keuch and [redacted] of DOJ and S. S. Mignosa and [redacted] of the Terrorist Section and [redacted] of the Director's Office, to discuss the proposed study. The meeting was at the request of Mr. Keuch who expressed his concern over the study. Mr. Keuch advised it was his preliminary judgement that it would be foolish to go ahead with this lengthy (18 months) study at a time when informant guidelines are being prepared and the charter is being debated. He cited the very real possibility that upon completion of the study, the conclusions would no longer be valid. Mr. Keuch said he had informed [redacted] of LEAA of his feelings in this regard. However, prior to officially terminating the continued funding of the study, Mr. Keuch wanted the views of those attending.

U.S.

Mr. Mignosa focused his comments on the problems such a study would present as enumerated above. Mr Mignosa also emphasized that the FBI was functioning effectively and efficiently within the Attorney General's Domestic Security Guidelines.

Memorandum to Mr. F. M. Mullen, Jr.

Re: Rand Corporation Proposed Study "The Impact of New Intelligence Rules on Investigative Effectiveness Against Terrorists and Related Crimes"

It was pointed out that the Guidelines have not hindered our investigations and have, in fact, allowed the FBI to refine our techniques and apply our limited manpower resources in a more economical and effective manner. It was also stressed that when the Guidelines went into effect, certain objections had to be overcome in convincing the Field that the Guidelines could be used effectively. This was an educational process that has paid off in increased successes in the terrorism field. To now present even the perception that the Guidelines are hindering our operation, as the continuation of this study would do, would result in unneeded confusion of our investigative personnel. The quote taken from Mr. Knight's testimony regarding the decrease of intelligence data furnished his agency by the FBI, has become somewhat overworked. The FBI is no longer disseminating millions of pages of information of questionable value to the USSS on the political and moral opinions of U. S. citizens, nor should we do so. The information being disseminated today is relevant data receiving agencies can use in the furtherance of their respective missions. It is impossible to estimate, but the percentage of FBI information now retained by the USSS is undoubtedly higher than two percent.

MA The awesome scope of the proposed study was also discussed. *MA* [redacted] cited a report by James Q. Wilson and Mark H. Moore of Harvard University entitled "Informants in the FBI: A Pilot Study." This paper was prepared to determine the feasibility of an in-depth study of the FBI's informant program. One of the conclusions drawn, was that such a study would not, in all likelihood, be feasible due to many factors, chiefly the immensity of the task.

It can, therefore, be assumed that if a study of the FBI's informant program appears too broad in scope, the Rand Corporation proposal becomes overwhelming in concept, and the consensus of opinion was that for this reason and those set forth above, Mr. Keuch should advise [redacted] that the study should not be continued. Mr. Keuch advised that should difficulties arise during his meeting with [redacted] he would advise Mr. Mignosa immediately so that should the study be continued, FBI and DOJ will again meet to discuss the limitations under which the study would proceed.

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June 10, 1980

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OUTSIDE SOURCE

Mr. Frances M. Mullen, Jr.
Criminal Investigative Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation
9th and Pennsylvania Avenues, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mr. Mullen:

As part of its continuing program of research on political violence, terrorism and other aspects of subnational conflict, The Rand Corporation will host an international conference on Terrorism and Low-level Conflict September 8-12, 1980. The five-day session will bring together approximately 100 participants including officials and scholars from approximately twelve countries.

The conference is jointly sponsored by the United States Departments of State, Justice, and Energy, and by Rand. It will be chaired by Ambassador Anthony C.E. Quainton, Director of the Office for Combatting Terrorism, Department of State.

I am pleased to extend to you an invitation to participate in the conference. Your presence will be a valuable contribution to its success.

The conference will review what we learned about the phenomenon in the 1970s and explore the future course of terrorism. Using the working group format successfully followed at previous conferences in Berlin and Tel Aviv, the 1980 conference will focus on four major topics:

- o The Terrorist Environment. A handful of nations seem to have suffered a disproportionate share of the world's terrorist violence. Is this inherent in the way we define terrorism, a result of biases in reporting, or should we seek explanations in the political, social, and economic conditions ~~that prevail~~ in these countries? What can we say about the role of patron states?
- o The Terrorists. What have we learned about the ~~mindset and~~ behavior of the individual terrorist? Has our knowledge in this area progressed very much since an international panel summarized the results of its discussions at the Berlin Conference in 1978? What have we learned about the patterns of decisionmaking in terrorist groups?

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- o The Government Response. In what areas of combatting terrorism have governments been most successful? What strategies have been tried and which have worked? What roles have intelligence, research, technology, new laws, political strategies played? What problem areas remain? Have we essentially reached the limits of international cooperation? Can we realistically expect more international cooperation? In what areas?
- o The Future Course of Terrorism. Has terrorism become a permanent feature of modern society? What directions might terrorists take in the future? More of the same? Or will terrorists alter their targets and tactics? Their ability to attract major attention and their coercive power declining, will terrorists threaten indiscriminate violence or mass murder? What effect will changes in the world political environment have on the future course of terrorism? Does terrorism decline with heightened world tensions? The threat of war?

In addition to addressing the assigned topic, each working group will identify important issues for future research in that area. Members of the group should also identify what data have been developed to support this research as well as their availability. One of the objectives of the conference will be to explore the means by which individual research efforts in various countries could be coordinated.

The 1980 conference will also include a simulation. It will differ somewhat from the simulations conducted at the Berlin Conference in 1978 and the Tel Aviv Conference in 1979 in that this one will consist of a series of three mini-games in which the teams will remain the same, but the scenarios will change. Since energy systems are often identified as future targets of terrorists, the scenarios will deal with terrorist-initiated incidents that in some way involve attacks on energy facilities or systems.

While remaining within the domain of subnational conflict, the scenarios will move the players beyond terrorism to incidents that entail not merely tactical problems surrounding the actual incident, but which will raise geopolitical issues as well. They will involve several government teams with built-in possibilities for diverging response strategies and disagreement among allies. And they will raise problems of domestic political pressures, and of government-private sector interface.

The provisions of our contract do not allow us to pay the transportation, hotel or per diem costs for any U.S. Government officials participating in the conference. This funding must come from the agency or department you will be representing. We will be happy to assist you in making reservations at a nearby hotel that offers government rates. We also would like you to be our guest at the banquet to be held during the conference.

I look forward to receiving your confirmation of our invitation. We will provide you with further details as the conference approaches. In the meantime, if you have any questions, please do not hesitate to call [redacted] or write me or my colleague [redacted] who will be in charge of administrative matters.

Sincerely yours,



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P
OUTSIDE SOURCE

July 17, 1980

[Redacted]
The ~~K~~and Corporation
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, California 90406

Dear [Redacted]

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Thank you for the invitation for the FBI's Criminal Investigative Division to participate in the international conference on Terrorism and Low-level Conflict, September 8-12, 1980.

Representing the division will be Special Agent Robert J. Ivey, Chief, Terrorism Section. Were I not going to be on vacation at the time, I would be accompanying him.

May the conference be a huge success.

Sincerely,

CM
Charles P. Monroe
Inspector - Deputy Assistant Director
Criminal Investigative Division

DE-39

62-101647-27

1-Mr. Revell
1-Mr. Monroe
1-Mr. Ivey
CPM [Redacted] (5)

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24 JUL 18 1980

Mailed 7/17/80
08 AUG 25 1980 *244*

7/1/80

**DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
INTERNAL ROUTING SLIP**

TO	BLDG.	ROOM	NAME/TITLE/ORGANIZATION	TO	BLDG.	ROOM	NAME/TITLE/ORGANIZATION
			(TL#)				(TL#)
JEH	7162		(214) THE DIRECTOR	JEH	5012		(235) MR. MONROE
				JEH	5012		(231) MR. CARO
JEH	7142		(235) MR. COLWELL	JEH	5030		(235) MR. GILBERT
JEH	7142		(235) MR. MULLEN	JEH	5155		(235) MR. HENEHAN
JEH	7110		(235) MR. JOSEPH	JEH	4042		(242) MR. TVEY (11/10)
				JEH	3076		(231) MR. McWEENEY
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JEH	3090		(241) MR. GREENLEAF	JEH	3015		(231) MR. RAMSEY
JEH	5012		(234) MR. LONG	JEH	3028		(231) MR. SEIDELL
ACADEMY			(152) MR. MCKENZIE	JEH	5027		(235) EXTRA DUTY DESK
JEH	7427		(245) MR. MINTZ				MR. BURGEOIS
JEH	4026		(232) MR. O'MALLEY				
JEH	7125		(213) MR. OTTO	JEH	3012		(231) MRS. COOPER
JEH	5012		(231) MR. REVELL	JEH	5012		(235) MISS EGGLESTON
JEH	11255		(341) MR. STAMES	JEH	5012		(235) MISS WALDRON
JEH	7222		(245) MR. YOUNG				
JEH	7176		(216) MR. STEEL				
JEH	18377		(152) MAIL ROOM				
JEH	7222		(245) PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE				
JEH	4437		(242) READING ROOM				
JEH	6247		(244) TELETYPE ROOM				

☐ RECOMMENDATION/COMMENT	☐ LOG	☒ NECESSARY ACTION
☐ SEE REMARKS ON REVERSE	☐ FILE	☐ COORDINATE
☐ MAKE COPIES (NO.)	☐ SEE ME	☐ PER INQUIRY
☐ RETURN (BY)	☐ CALL ME	☐ INFORMATION

FROM	BLDG.	ROOM
OLIVER B. REVELL	JEH	5030 (TL#235)
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION	PHONE	DATE
CHARLES P. MONROE	4260	8/2/80

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Executive Assistant Director

1980

Director	☒ Mr. Mohr Mr. Mohr Rm. 5012
EAD - Adm.	☐ DAD, CID, Rm. 3012
EAD - LES.	
Ident. Div.	
Training Div.	☐ Mr. Fulton, Rm. 4026
Adm. Serv. Div.	☐ Mr. Nolan, Rm. 4204
Records Mgt. Div.	
Intell. Div.	
Criminal Investi. Div.	
Laboratory Div.	
Tech. Serv. Div.	
Legal Counsel Div.	
Plan. & Inspec. Div.	☐ Reading Room, Rm. 4437
Public Affairs Office	☐ Mail Room, Rm. 1B327
	☐ Teletype, Rm. 6247
☐ Miss Devine	
☐ Mr. Bruemmer	
☐ Mr. Roin	
☐ Mr. Steel	
☐ Telephone Room	☐ For Approp. Action
	☐ For Your Approval
	☐ Initial & Return
	☒ Please Call Me
	☐ For Information
☐ Miss Grage	☐ Per Conversation
☐ Miss Southers	☐ Please See Me

M

Rm.

Remarks

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. O. B. Revell

FROM : R. J. Ivey

SUBJECT: RAND CORPORATION PROPOSED STUDY,
"THE IMPACT OF NEW INTELLIGENCE RULES
ON INVESTIGATIVE EFFECTIVENESS AGAINST
TERRORISTS AND RELATED CRIMES"

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1 - Mr. W. L. Bailey

Attn: [redacted]

DATE: 7/10/80

1 - Mr. O. B. Revell

1 - Mr. C. P. Monroe

1 - Mr. R. J. Ivey

1 - [redacted]

Exec AD Inv. _____
 Exec AD Adm. _____
 Exec AD LES _____
 Asst. Dir.: _____
 Adm. Serv. _____
 Crim. Inv. _____
 Ident. _____
 Intell. _____
 Laboratory _____
 Legal Coun. _____
 Plan. & Insp. _____
 Rec. Mgnt. _____
 Tech. Servs. _____
 Training _____
 Public Affs. Off. _____
 Telephone Rm. _____
 Director's Sec'y _____

PURPOSE: To provide information concerning the current status of this study and to advise of a meeting between Deputy Assistant Attorney General (DAAG) Robert Keuch, Department of Justice (DOJ), and Special Agent (SA) [redacted] of the Terrorism Section, Criminal Investigative Division (CID), on 7/2/80.

RECOMMENDATION: That the FBI cooperate with Rand Corporation in the captioned study by providing information that is currently in the public domain and/or materials that would be releasable under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

APPROVED: [redacted]

Director _____
 Exec. AD-Inv. _____
 Exec. AD-Adm. _____
 Exec. AD-LES _____

Adm. Serv. _____
 Crim. Inv. _____

Ident. _____
 Intell. _____

Laboratory _____

Legal Coun. _____

Plan. & Insp. _____

Rec. Mgnt. _____

Tech. Servs. _____

Training _____

Public Affs. Off. _____

DETAILS: By way of background, the proposed Rand Corporation study has been funded by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) to make an assessment of whether or not the "new rules" under which law enforcement and intelligence agencies are currently operating had impaired law enforcement's effectiveness against terrorists and related crimes.

62-101647-25
 By memorandum S. S. Mignosa to Mr. F. M. Mullen, Jr., dated 3/3/80, an analysis of this study was furnished. In brief, this analysis was that the study was staggering in scope, since it covered current and proposed statutes and guidelines relative to terrorism, Freedom of Information - Privacy Act matters, informants, sophisticated technological concepts, and undercover projects. The consensus of opinion of the FBI and DOJ was that this study is unnecessary, possibly damaging to morale and effectiveness, and should not continue.

On 7/2/80, SA [redacted] Terrorism Section, CID, met with DAAG Keuch at Mr. Keuch's request. DAAG Keuch advised that the proposed study had, in fact, been fully funded and was in its preliminary stages. DAAG Keuch advised that he saw three avenues of approach

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62-101647-25

17 AUG 4 1980

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Memorandum to Mr. O. B. Revell

Re: RAND CORPORATION PROPOSED STUDY,
"THE IMPACT OF NEW INTELLIGENCE RULES
ON INVESTIGATIVE EFFECTIVENESS AGAINST
TERRORISTS AND RELATED CRIMES"

the DOJ and FBI could take in this matter. These are: 1) not to cooperate in the study at all; 2) provide information to Rand Corporation that is already in the public domain and/or materials that would be releasable through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA); or 3) provide complete cooperation to the Rand Corporation. DAAG Keuch advised that he had received a preliminary report from Rand Corporation and after a brief perusal of the document, had no objections to the content, at this point.

DAAG Keuch stated that he has had numerous meetings with [redacted] of the proposed study, and that our mutual apprehensions concerning this study have been somewhat alleviated. The primary thrust of the study emphasizes local law enforcement problems caused by FOIA, the rulings of various courts, and is not, in fact, an analysis of the effect of the Attorney General's Domestic Security Guidelines. In addition, DAAG Keuch advised that he has been given every assurance by [redacted] that before a final report is prepared, the DOJ and FBI will have an opportunity to review the report and make necessary revisions, if necessary. Specifically, DAAG Keuch cited revising or deleting information which would have a tendency to identify confidential sources. b6 b7C

DAAG Keuch suggested that for the present, a list of documents that have been preprocessed by the FBI that may be of interest to [redacted] be obtained and furnished to him for transmittal to [redacted] b6 b7C

On 7/2/80, SA [redacted] Freedom of Information - Privacy Acts Branch, Records Management Division, was contacted regarding DAAG Keuch's request, and a list such as DAAG Keuch requested is being furnished. SA [redacted] will maintain contact with DAAG Keuch regarding this matter, and you will be kept apprised of all future requests for information by DAAG Keuch and [redacted]

Rand
SANTA MONICA, CA 90406


National Security Research

7 August 1980
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34

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The Honorable William H. Webster
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
9th Street & Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20535

OUTSIDE SOURCE

Dear Mr. Director:

I am writing to request your assistance regarding a study being conducted at The Rand Corporation under ^{NR} ~~NSA~~ Grant 79-NI-AX-0108. no lcc.

Rand is examining the impact of new intelligence rules on investigative and prosecutorial effectiveness in domestic security cases. The term "intelligence rules" is being interpreted broadly to include all federal, state and local statutes, federal and state high court decisions, and federal, state and local administrative regulations that affect intelligence gathering and dissemination, investigative techniques employed, and the use of such information in prosecution. Examples at the federal level are the Privacy and Freedom of Information Acts and the Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI Domestic Security Investigations. Examples at the local level are the Seattle Police Intelligence Ordinance and the Los Angeles Police Departments' Guidelines for its Public Disorder and Intelligence Division. 


The study is restricted to incidents and cases involving politically-motivated crimes--violent demonstrations, bombings, murder, kidnapping, weapons possession, and the like. The main characteristic is that the planned or actual crime was largely or totally motivated by political or social concerns rather than personal gain.

^{DE-69} 62-101647-29
The impact of the new rules is being assessed in three ways. One is to examine a set of successful cases that occurred before the new rules were implemented (i.e., largely before 1974). By successful, we mean a crime was prevented by law enforcement or, subsequent to the crime, perpetrators were identified, apprehended and successfully prosecuted. By determining which pieces of information were crucial in each case and which investigative methods were used to gather this information (informants, undercover officers, electronic eavesdropping, etc.), an assessment can then be made to determine whether and how the outcomes of such cases may have been affected by the introduction of new rules.

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The second approach is to examine a set of successful and unsuccessful cases that occurred more recently, after the rules went into effect, and ask the opposite question: Would the outcomes likely be different had they occurred before the rules were implemented?

20 OCT 8 1980

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ENCLOSURE 149 

7 August 1980

The third approach is to elicit the views of appropriate federal and local law enforcement officials and prosecutors in face-to-face interviews as to their perceptions about the effects of the new rules on investigative and prosecutorial effectiveness.

Toward this end Rand staff members met early with Associate Deputy Attorney Robert L. Keuch on March 18 of this year. At that time he asked for a letter from Rand outlining our needs and indicated that he would take it up with appropriate FBI officials. We submitted such a letter to Mr. Keuch on April 8. On May 22 Rand personnel again met with Mr. Keuch who indicated that he was in touch with Bureau personnel and was following through on our request. This was followed up by Rand in a letter to Mr. Keuch on May 30 stating the need for a timely response to our request. On June 13, when we submitted an incomplete working draft for comments that synthesized and analyzed some of the intelligence constraints, we again noted that we were still awaiting assistance from the Bureau. It has now been four months since our first request.

Thus far our efforts have focused on interviews with state and local law enforcement and prosecution officials. But, since many of such cases have intimately involved the FBI, the study could not be complete without the involvement and help of the Bureau. The type of help needed is described in the enclosure to this letter. We would appreciate your assistance in obtaining an early decision in this matter.

Sincerely,



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Enclosure as noted

RAND REQUEST FOR FBI ASSISTANCE

- * Rand needs help from the FBI in implementing an analysis of about 50 successful incidents in which a crime was prevented or perpetrators were apprehended and successfully prosecuted--that occurred before various new intelligence rules were adopted. Essentially, this can be taken to mean cases concluded before 1974. We would also like to analyze upwards of 50 successful and unsuccessful incidents that occurred after 1974.

Let me clarify and emphasize that Rand is not interested in doing case studies in which we would examine raw case files, nor are we interested in knowing the names of, or talking with, informants in any of these cases. What we seek are FBI-prepared summaries of each case, of about a half to a full page in length, that would ideally include the following:

- o Dates during which the investigation was conducted
- o Location (city and state)
- o Date concluded (if prevention was the outcome) or dates prosecution began and ended
- o Court jurisdiction (federal or state) and location
- o Prosecutor's office (federal or state) and name of prosecutor involved
- o A narrative summary of the facts in the case
- o The investigative techniques used to gather (what turned out to be) the information crucial to the case's successful outcome
- o The outcome (crime prevented or arrest charges, convicted charges and sentences imposed, if successfully prosecuted)
- o Name(s) of principal FBI investigator(s) involved

Where necessary, particularly in cases of prevention of planned criminal actions, we could utilize data even if the names of suspects, defendants and organizations involved were deleted.

There will probably be a need to follow up in some of these cases by contacting the principal investigator involved in order to clarify certain facts or to obtain more detail regarding investigative techniques employed. And we would probably need to contact the prosecutor involved in some of the cases to discuss and compare the defenses used during the

62-101647-29
ENCLOSURE

prosecution with the defenses that could be mounted today in the new-rule environment. We need to know whether the case was prosecuted in federal or state court, and if the latter, in which city and state, because recent state court decisions, state and local statutes, and local administrative regulations regarding intelligence rules differ widely. The end objective, of course, is to assess the impacts of the various statutory, court and administrative rules on case outcomes, had these successful past cases occurred today and had successful and unsuccessful later cases occurred before the new rules were implemented.

1 - Mr. F. M. Mullen, Jr.
1 - Mr. A. L. Steel, Jr.
1 - Mr. R. P. Finzel
Attn: [redacted]
1 - Mr. O. B. Revell
1 - Mr. C. P. Monroe

October 2, 1980

1 - Mr. R. J. Ivey
1 - [redacted]

[redacted]
National Security Research
The Rand Corporation
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, California 90406

Dear [redacted]

Reference is made to your letter of August 7, 1980, wherein you requested the assistance of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) regarding a Rand Corporation study designed to examine the impact of "new intelligence rules" on investigative and prosecutorial effectiveness in domestic security cases.

In your letter, you advise that you have met on several occasions, beginning in March, 1980, with Associate Deputy Attorney General Robert L. Keuch of the Department of Justice and that you are still awaiting assistance from the FBI. Your letter states you are requesting FBI-prepared summaries of approximately 50 cases of one-half to one page in length, which would include at least nine key elements including the identity of the FBI Agent responsible for the investigation of each case.

DE-69

For your information, representatives of the FBI have met with Mr. Keuch on several occasions regarding this matter. Your letter of August 7, 1980, is the first official request for FBI summaries the Bureau has received from either The Rand Corporation or Mr. Keuch. Although your desire to obtain certain facts from FBI files was made known to the FBI at the outset, no action was taken until a specific request was furnished by you that would allow the FBI to determine whether or not it would be possible to comply with your request. On July 2, 1980, Mr. Keuch requested that the FBI cooperate with The Rand Corporation in this study by providing information that is

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See NOTE Page Five

MAILED 13
OCT 13 1980
Exec AD Inv.
Exec AD Adm.
Exec AD LES
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs.
Crim. Inv.
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Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

20 OCT 8 1980

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currently available in the public domain and/or materials that would be releasable under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The FBI agreed to cooperate as requested and certain documents have been furnished to you per your request.

The specific request for FBI assistance contained in your letter of August 7, 1980, is for FBI-prepared summaries of 50 investigative incidents (cases) in which a crime was prevented or perpetrators were apprehended and successfully prosecuted. These incidents are to be those which occurred before various "new intelligence rules" were adopted, which you date as 1974. You also advise that you would like to analyze approximately 50 additional successful and unsuccessful incidents that have occurred after 1974. In studying your request, it is assumed that when you refer to "new intelligence rules" you are alluding to the Attorney General's Guidelines for the conduct of domestic security and foreign counterintelligence investigations, informant guidelines and other related regulations under which the FBI has been operating since approximately 1976.

Further study indicates you require information on cases meeting certain criteria prior to 1974 and 50 cases investigated after 1974. Regretfully, certain difficulties have been encountered in our attempts to obtain the information you have requested. These difficulties are the result of the way our Central Indices and Records System is designed and the result of the differences between the FBI's administrative and investigative procedures in use prior to 1976, and those procedures in effect since that time. Prior to 1976, a cohesive program that is today identified as the terrorism program did not exist. All violations of Federal law under FBI investigative jurisdiction were investigated regardless of whether they were political in nature or committed purely for economic gain. In other words, no distinction was made between a criminal act and an act of terrorism. Consequently, our filing systems do not reflect, prior to 1976, any program differentiation between investigative matters handled. After 1976, the terrorism program was created and is today comprised of 18 different investigative classifications. Therefore, in order for the FBI to prepare the summaries you have requested,

[REDACTED]

it is first necessary to retrieve the investigative files in which the information you desire is contained. Without specific identifying data, such as the title of the case, type of investigation, and the subjects involved, it would be necessary for us to randomly review thousands of investigative files that fall within the 18 classifications that today make up the terrorism program. With the serious manpower constraints that exist today, this expenditure of our limited manpower resources is not possible.

As pointed out above, the FBI has investigated and administered terrorist-related matters prior to 1976 as strictly criminal violations, indistinguishable from any other. After 1976, several violations were put together under an administrative and investigative device known as program management. Thus, the terrorism program, made up of violations determined to be primarily political in nature, was created. One element of the terrorism program is domestic security. Domestic security investigations are intelligence gathering vehicles utilized to prevent, wherever possible, acts of terrorism from occurring. The domestic security guidelines have never had any impact upon the FBI's ability to investigate and successfully prosecute those individuals who commit acts of terrorism, as those acts are not investigated under the domestic security guidelines. They are purely violations of law and are investigated as such. The decrease in active domestic security investigations which resulted from the introduction of the domestic security guidelines has, of course, limited our collection of intelligence information. It is, therefore, conceivable that certain crimes may have been prevented had this reduction in our intelligence-gathering function not occurred. Unfortunately, there is no known method of proving or disproving this assumption.

The FBI wishes to cooperate in any practical manner that would enable you to complete your study. However, as I have attempted to explain, in the absence of specific identifying data regarding the cases you desire to review which would enable us to retrieve the investigative files, your

[REDACTED]

proposal does not appear to be feasible. Should you be in a position to further identify the cases you wish to study or modify your proposal, the FBI will attempt to comply with your request commensurate with the availability of sufficient manpower to conduct the research and analysis you request.

Very truly yours,

/s/
Oliver B. Revell
Assistant Director
Criminal Investigative Division


NOTE: By memorandum S. S. Mignosa to Mr. F. M. Mullen, Jr., dated 3/3/80, captioned "Rand Corporation Proposed Study, 'The Impact on New Intelligence Rules on Investigative Effectiveness Against Terrorism and Related Crimes,'" and memorandum R. J. Ivey to Mr. O. B. Revell dated 7/10/80, the same caption, the pertinent facts concerning this matter were presented. It is noted that at the outset, the FBI strongly opposed the conduct of this study for numerous reasons set forth in the referenced memoranda. The FBI reluctantly agreed to cooperate in this study after Mr. Keuch advised that the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) had already funded the study and it would not be prudent to attempt to stop it. In addition, Mr. Keuch advised during a meeting with SA [redacted] Terrorism Section, Criminal Investigative Division (see referenced memorandum of 7/10/80), that for the time being the FBI should cooperate with Rand Corporation by providing information currently in the public domain or attainable under FOIA. This assistance has been made available to the Rand Corporation.

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The referenced letter is the first official request received by the FBI from either Mr. Keuch or the Rand Corporation in regard to the FBI preparing summaries of previous FBI investigations. It is estimated that a great deal of Agent time would be required to comply with the Rand Corporation's request for written summaries of 100 cases that meet the criteria they have established. This issue is, however, not pertinent at this time in view of our inability to retrieve the files on the 100 investigative matters that meet the Rand Corporation requirements without additional data about these investigative matters being first provided by the Rand Corporation or through some other method of first identifying the 100 cases that meet the criteria. In view of these facts, the above letter is being furnished to Mr. Landi of the Rand Corporation.

APPROVED: [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]
[redacted] [redacted] [redacted]
[redacted] [redacted] [redacted]
[redacted] [redacted] [redacted]
[redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

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CONFIDENTIAL

Rand
SANTA MONICA, CA 90406

16 December 1981

OUTSIDE SOURCE

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Federal Bureau of Investigation
Ninth and Pennsylvania Avenues
Washington, DC 20535

Attention: Mr. Robert J. Ivey
Section Chief, Terrorism Section

Dear Bob:

Since 1970, there have been more than 50 threat messages in which the author or authors threatened to detonate a nuclear explosive device or disperse radioactive material in American cities. These events, although generally not publicized, create considerable disruption and could, if publicized, cause alarm and panic. Following such a threat in Los Angeles in 1975, it was deemed necessary to create a capability for rapidly assessing the credibility of nuclear threat messages.

Two developments are making the traditional method of assessing the credibility of nuclear threats more difficult. Although there is confidence in U.S. safeguards and accounting systems, there is an increasing amount of nuclear material beyond American control. The spread of nuclear programs throughout the world makes it increasingly difficult to say with a high degree of confidence that the authors of such a threat do not possess nuclear material.

The spread of nuclear knowledge increases the number of people who possess at least a theoretical knowledge of nuclear weapons design. Even a layman, with little technical background, can use the right words. It becomes more and more likely that the designs or equations submitted to support a nuclear threat will be correct. These developments place a growing burden on a behavioral assessment in support of the technical assessment.

When a nuclear message is received by the FBI, which has jurisdiction over violations of the Atomic Energy Act, it is immediately forwarded to a special FBI desk in Washington. The Emergency Action Coordination Team in the Department of Energy is notified. This team then activates the Threat Assessment Team (TAT). The TAT consists of separate teams linked by computer but working separately, at least until after the initial assessment is made. Two teams, one at Los Alamos, the other at Lawrence Livermore, address the technical aspects of the message. Two other teams, one at Rand, the other at Syracuse, address the behavioral aspects. The combined assessments are communicated to the Department of Energy.

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CONFIDENTIAL

If enclosures are withdrawn or not attached the classification of this correspondence will be cancelled.

UNCLASSIFIED


Mr. Robert J. Ivey
Page Two

To support this assessment role, The Rand Corporation, under Department of Energy sponsorship, is exploring various techniques for making a behavioral assessment. I have enclosed a copy of a recent Rand Report by Dr. Joseph Krofcheck, a psychiatrist and Rand consultant who is a principal investigator on this project, which describes and categorizes past nuclear threats.

Cordially,



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 Enclosure: One copy R-2626-DOE, *A Review of Nuclear Threats in the United States from October 1970 to July 1979* (U), Confidential, NSI, Joseph L. Krofcheck, January 1981.

UNCLASSIFIED

Rand

SANTA MONICA, CA 90406

Corporation

April 14, 1982

Mr. Charles P. Monroe
Deputy Assistant Director
Criminal Investigative Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C. 20535

OUTSIDE SOURCE

Dear Mr. Monroe:

As part of our continuing research program on terrorism, we have produced four more publications.

William Fowler's Terrorism Data Bases: A Comparison of Missions, Methods, and Systems describes the growing number of terrorism data bases. It will appeal particularly to those members of the research community who are concerned with the quantitative analysis of terrorism.

The second, by Bruce Hoffman, Right-Wing Terrorism in Europe, was prompted by the bombings at the Bologna railroad station, the Munich Oktoberfest, and the Rue Copernic Synagogue in Paris, all of which occurred in 1980. Bruce's Note examines the right-wing organizations presently active in Italy, Germany, and France.

The other two papers are mine. One, Talking to Terrorists, looks at the problems of communication during a terrorist kidnapping or hostage incident and offers some general suggestions. The other, Diplomats on the Front Line, provides an overview of terrorist attacks on diplomats and diplomatic facilities, which increased 60 percent in 1980 and 1981 over the previous two-year period.

As always, your comments or questions are welcomed.

Cordially,

Brian

Brian Michael Jenkins

BMJ-bts

62-101647-32

Enclosures: One copy each: N-1503-RC, N-1856-AF, P-5749, P-6750


enclosures in room 4246.
Terrorism Section

12 JUN 15 1982

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1 - Mr. Revell
1 - Mr. Klein

June 11, 1982


Rand Corporation
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, California 90406

OUTSIDE SOURCE

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
Dear 

I am in receipt of your letter to Assistant Director Monroe dated April 14, 1982 in which you enclosed copies of four new Rand publications dealing with various aspects of terrorism. I have read these documents with interest and have forwarded them to Stan Klein, Chief of our Terrorism Section. I am sure that the information contained therein will assist the FBI in its counterterrorism efforts and I am most appreciative of your making them available to us for review.

I have recently been appointed Assistant Director of the Criminal Investigative Division by Director Webster and as such, replace Mr. Monroe who has assumed other responsibilities. I am highly supportive of the Bureau's role in our nations fight against terrorism and have become personally involved in a number of areas that deal directly with that issue. Among these is the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism, chaired by the Department of State, in which I will serve as FBI representative.

I look forward to future dealings with both yourself and the Rand Corporation in this critical area.

Sincerely,


OBE/8
Oliver B. Revell
Assistant Director
Criminal Investigative Division

412

62-101647-33

NOTE: Publications will remain with the Terrorism Section.

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FBI/DOJ



16 August 1982

OUTSIDE SOURCE

Special Agent Robert J. Ivey
Chief, Terrorism Section
United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C. 20535

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b7C

Dear Mr. Ivey:

For many years now, Sandia Laboratories, at the direction of the Department of Energy, has played a leading role in developing and testing measures to protect U.S. nuclear facilities against theft, hostile attack, or sabotage. In 1975, Sandia asked The Rand Corporation to assist it in this effort by describing the potential criminal adversary, or rather the spectrum of potential adversaries who conceivably might carry out malevolent criminal actions against nuclear programs and facilities.

The enclosed report represents the findings of the third phase of that research project. It analyzes the types of actions that various kinds of adversaries (economically motivated criminals, political terrorists, hostile employees, etc.) would find most and least attractive, based upon their motivations and their assessment of their own capabilities.

With my best regards.

V-29 Cor 01-53

10-101647-34



Ca



TO AUG 26 1982

Enclosure: One copy R-2803-SL.

ENC 55 SEP 20 1982
324 4251

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Rand
SANTA MONICA, CA. 90406

16 August 1982

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OUTSIDE SOURCE

Mr. Oliver B. Revell, Asst. Dir.
Criminal Investigative Division
U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, DC 20535

Dear Mr. Revell:

For many years now, Sandia Laboratories, at the direction of the Department of Energy, has played a leading role in developing and testing measures to protect U.S. nuclear facilities against theft, hostile attack, or sabotage. In 1975, Sandia asked The Rand Corporation to assist it in this effort by describing the potential criminal adversary, or rather the spectrum of potential adversaries who conceivably might carry out malevolent criminal actions against nuclear programs and facilities.

The enclosed report represents the findings of the third phase of that research project. It analyzes the types of actions that various kinds of adversaries (economically motivated criminals, political terrorists, hostile employees, etc.) would find most and least attractive, based upon their motivations and their assessment of their own capabilities.

With my best regards.

Cordially,


Enclosure: One copy R-2803-SL.

10 SEP 8 1982

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September 7, 1982

OUTSIDE SOURCE



The Rand Corporation
~~1700 Main Street~~
Santa Monica, California 90406

Dear 

I have received your letter of August 16, 1982, enclosing a copy of the booklet entitled, "The Appeal of Nuclear Crimes to the Spectrum of Potential Adversaries." I certainly appreciate your providing me with this booklet and, although I have not had a chance to review the entire contents, a cursory review indicates to me it will be very useful.

I am also circulating it through our Terrorism Section and to others in special events management as I believe they too will find it to be of significance. I appreciate your continuing interest in terrorist matters, and hope that we will have an opportunity for an in-depth discussion in the near future.

With best wishes,

Sincerely, 

181
Oliver B. Revell
Assistant Director
Criminal Investigative Division

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SEP. 7 1982
FBI

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Memorandum



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To : Mr. Young *YHL*

Date 12/13/82

From : P. A. Zolbe *3/CH*

Subject : PUBLICATION REQUEST FROM THE RAND CORPORATION
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING (UCR) PROGRAM


PURPOSE: To advise that a \$5.00 check was received on December 9, 1982, from The Rand Corporation to purchase a UCR publication.

RECOMMENDATION: None, for information.

APPROVED:	Adm. Servs. _____	Laboratory _____
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Director _____	Ident. _____	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. ☐
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
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DETAILS: On December 9, 1982, a check was received in the mail from The Rand Corporation for a copy of the 1981 "Bomb Summary." No letter was enclosed (see attached). On December 10, 1982, the above-mentioned publication was sent to ☐ of The Rand Corporation.



(4)

CAIA



V-10T

DE-12T

62-101647-37

15 DEC 15 1982

ENCLOSURE

59 JAN 11 1983

Off. of Cong. and Pub. Aff.

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UNITED STATES

BUSINESS REPLY MAIL

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THE RAND CORPORATION
ATTN: ERNESTINE BURDETTE/LIBRARY
1700 MAIN STREET
SANTA MONICA, CA 90406

Form 538 (Rev. 3/81)

THIS IS A CHECK

ORDER NUMBER **7323** DATE **12-1-82** VOID AFTER 30 DAYS **368850**
CHECK NUMBER



No **7323**

PAY Five and 100/100 dollars \$ 5.00
NOT VALID FOR OVER \$75

TO THE ORDER OF
• Federal Bureau of Investigation
U.S. Government Department of Justice
Uniform Crime Report
Washington, D.C. 20535

GEN. ORG. NO. **7830-540** CHECK NO. **8213** DISCOUNT **16-4** CHECK AMOUNT **1220**

SECURITY PACIFIC NATIONAL BANK
1250 FOURTH STREET
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401

AUTHOR

ITEM 722-A. ASI/MF/3 J1.14/7-4:863/981
"BOMB SUMMARY" 1981 iii + 28 p.

⑈07323⑈

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PURCHASE ORDER INSTRUCTIONS

1. This purchase order is for one (1) unit unless otherwise indicated. Your check is the first copy. Fill in the correct amount on the pay line and in the upper right hand corner.
2. Enclose this copy of the purchase order form with the shipment as a packing slip.
If the material ordered is not available within 30 days:
3. Complete the report section (this copy) and return the report and the check in the envelope provided.

820550

62-101647-37

ENCLOSURE

February 18, 1983

OUTSIDE SOURCE

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The Rand Corporation
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, California 90406

Dear [REDACTED]

I want to thank you for your courtesy in sending me a copy of "Terrorism and Beyond." From my preliminary perusal, it appears that it will be both interesting and informative in carrying out my anti-terrorist responsibilities. In that regard, I am happy to forward to you a copy of the FBI's 1982 Analysis of Terrorist Incidents in the United States. I think that you will find it of interest.

I would like to again extend an invitation to you to stop by and visit with me and with Stan Klein, Chief of our Terrorism Section, anytime that you are here in the Washington area.

With warm best wishes,

Sincerely,

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Oliver B. Revell
Assistant Director
Criminal Investigative Division

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FEB 23 1983

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62-101647-58

10 MAR 1 1983

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Date: August 29, 1990

To: The Rand Corporation
Publication Department
1700 Main Street
P.O. Box 2138
Santa Monica, California

From: David W. Johnson
Chief, Drug Section

Subject: ~~X~~ MONEY FROM CRIME
A Study of Economics of Drug Dealing
in Washington, D.C., R-3894-RF

A complimentary copy of the referenced publication was presented to an Executive Officer of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). An analysis of this publication determined that it will be of great utility to the FBI.

The Drug Intelligence Unit (DIU), FBIHQ, is requesting five additional copies for use by DIU and the Drug Section as reference material for research purposes.

Please direct your response to Intelligence Research Specialist (IRS) [redacted] JEH Building, Room 7325. Any questions concerning this request should be directed to IRS [redacted] at (202) 324-5674.

- 1 - Mr. Johnson (info)
- 1 - Mr. Balgley (info)
- 1 - Mr. Hunt
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - [redacted]

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Best Copy Available



FBI FACSIMILE COVERSHEET

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To: FBIHQ, Confidential Unit
(Name of Office)

Date: 6/15/94

Facsimile number: 324-3156

Attn: _____

Telephone No.: _____

From: _____
(Name of Office)

Subject: Letter for Anne Hoffman
and Santa Monica A.

Special Handling Instructions: Hand for you

ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

ENCLOSURE

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Memorandum

To : Director, FBI

Date

From : SAC, LOS ANGELES

ATT.: Correspondence Unit
Office of Public Affairsb3
b7ESubject : CORRESPONDENCE MATTERS
RECOMMENDATION FOR LETTER FROM DIRECTOR

This form may be utilized where applicable in conjunction with Bureau letter to Albany and all offices dated 11-7-73 captioned "Correspondence Matters."

Name to whom letter should be addressed

Rank/Title

Agency Address (include Zip Code) (Home Address if Appropriate, i.e., Retired)

RAND, 1700 MAIN STREET, P.O. BOX 2138, SANTA MONICA,
CA 90407-2138

Person being commended or thanked (include rank/title and address, if different than above)

DIRECTOR, STRATEGY AND DOCTRINE

b6
b7C

BASIS FOR RECOMMENDATION: (Amplify and "Remarks.")

- ☐ Retirement (Date of function if being presented)
- ☐ Promotion (Indicate from _____ to _____)
- ☐ Serious illness (Indicate when confined; if hospital confinement will be.)
- ☐ Death (Indicate next of kin, if any, and children, if any.)
- ☐ Death in family (Indicate relationship)
- ☐ Editorial or feature article (Indicate whether complimentary or derogatory; also indicate editor or newspaperman to be written with address and Zip Code.)
- ☒ Appreciation for assistance in Bureau case. Identify case by caption under "Remarks."
- ☐ Other _____

REMARKS: (Set forth below a clear, concise, justification for recommendation. Be specific, omit generalities. If possible, include Bureau file number. Note if copies should be distributed or sent to supervisor or subordinates and provide a date to do so. Indicate if letter is to be presented by SAC and/or if there is a deadline involved.)

1- ~~ENCLOSURE~~
Sent via Memo to
SAC, Los Angeles Attn: SSA

Enc.

dated
6/17/94

6/21/94

ENCLOSURE

FBI/DOJ

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Best Copy Available

[redacted] Rand,
Santa Monica, California, has accepted a Professorship at [redacted]
[redacted]

For the past several years, [redacted] has been a good friend and supporter of the FBI Los Angeles FCI program, especially the counterterrorism subprogram. Beginning in October 1991, using the auspices of his office, he organized and conducted three counterterrorism training days at the Rand Corporation for the benefit of the Los Angeles Task Force on Terrorism (LATFOT). Besides LATFOT, the attendees included officers working counterterrorism investigation from the Los Angeles Police Department, the Los Angeles Sheriff's Office, the U.S. Secret Service, the Department of State, as well as Special Agents and Supervisors from the San Francisco, Sacramento, and San Diego offices of the FBI.

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The curriculum for these training days primarily dealt with the everchanging global political situation which impacts directly on international terrorism investigations in the U.S., and Hoffman enlisted the assistance of Rand's experts to update the attendees on topics regarding Middle East politics and culture, South American terrorism, the current situation in the former republics of Yugoslavia, and the increasingly dangerous situation in North Korea, etc. In addition, [redacted] always provided his own assessment of current world terrorism threats, including both the international and domestic arenas. The educational training days were provided by the Rand Co. at no expense to the FBI.

Furthermore, [redacted] went one step further and acted as a broker for the FBI with his Rand colleagues attending meetings with experts on various areas of concern to FBI's FCI special agents and supervisors. Also, [redacted] has continued to provide LATFOT with copies of his assessments of current threats in terrorism. More recently, [redacted] has again assisted in organizing its upcoming counterterrorism in-service. June 20 - 24, 1994.

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
Accordingly, [redacted] assistance and friendship will be missed by FBI Los Angeles, and SAC Los Angeles recommends a letter of appreciation for [redacted] be prepared over the Director's signature as an expression of the FBI's gratitude for his helpful cooperation and assistance.

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A copy of the letter should be sent to: [redacted]
[redacted] Rand, 1700 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138. Recipient's copy should be sent to SSA [redacted] FBILA, for hand delivery prior to June 22, 1994. Correspondence Unit's assistance is appreciated.

June 21, 1994

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[Redacted]
Rand Corporation
Santa Monica, California

Dear [Redacted]

It is a pleasure to join my colleagues in Los Angeles in congratulating you on your [Redacted] and in expressing our sincere gratitude for your professional friendship and outstanding support to the FBI.

I would like to take this occasion to thank you for your superb assistance to my associates, especially the members of the Los Angeles Task Force on Terrorism, in fulfilling their investigative responsibilities and in meeting the challenges of the ever-changing global political situation. We in the FBI have benefited immensely from the training programs you have made available to us and other law enforcement agencies through the Rand Corporation, and your personal assessments of current world terrorism threats and trends, both international and domestic, have been particularly beneficial.

The spirit of cooperation you have fostered among law enforcement personnel throughout California will last for years. I want you to know how much we appreciate your work in enhancing our ability to better serve our citizens, your willingness to be of assistance, and your many contributions to our investigative efforts. My colleagues will surely miss their productive contacts with you.

We know you will enjoy the challenging responsibilities of your new position in Scotland, and we hope all of your future endeavors will be most rewarding. Please accept our warmest best wishes for every happiness in the years to come.


Sincerely yours,

Louis J. Freeh

Louis J. Freeh
Director


[Redacted] (attached)
Rand Corporation
Post Office Box 2138
Santa Monica, California 90407-2138
1 - SAC, Los Angeles [Redacted] (attached)
ReurFD-468 and urfac 6/15/94.

NOTE: HQ files checked.



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FBI/DOJ

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U.S. AIR FORCE

Project

RESEARCH MEMORANDUM

RAND



This is a working paper. It may be expanded, modified, or withdrawn at any time. The views, conclusions, and recommendations expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views or policies of the U. S. Air Force.

The RAND *Corporation*

SANTA MONICA

CALIFORNIA

62-101647-8

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U. S. AIR FORCE

PROJECT RAND

RESEARCH MEMORANDUM

COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND THE POLITICAL POLICE IN THE SOVIET UNION

Elsa Bernaut
Melville J. Ruggles

RM-1674

15 March 1956

Assigned to _____

This is a working paper. It may be expanded, modified, or withdrawn at any time. The views, conclusions, and recommendations expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views or policies of the United States Air Force.

The **RAND** Corporation

1700 MAIN ST. • SANTA MONICA • CALIFORNIA

SUMMARY

Ever since the establishment of the Soviet state in 1917, the political police has played an important role in Russian society. As time went on, the role and function of the police changed with changes in the basic policies and purposes of the Soviet state. The last important shift has taken place since the death of Stalin.

Except for a brief period after Stalin's death, the political police never participated in policy-making or in the selection of rulers of the Soviet state. From the very beginning, the Communist Party deliberately kept the police in a separate and subordinate position. The police was intended to serve as the Party's instrument of suppression. And since, at any given time, the Party's policies were unpopular with one or another section of the population, the police never lacked enemies to suppress.

It was fairly easy to keep the political police out of policy-making during the early years, because its first head, Dzerzhinsky, was completely subservient to the Party. But even during Dzerzhinsky's lifetime, the role of the political

police began to change. Stalin convinced Dzherzhinsky that the Party had to be saved from Stalin's political opponents. When Dzherzhinsky agreed, the political police was transformed from instrument of the whole Party to instrument of a faction within the Party. It was not long before it became Stalin's own instrument.

With the police now a personal, rather than a Party instrument, Stalin felt it necessary to guard constantly against the possibility that control of this instrument would pass into the hands of one of his enemies. He sought to control the police by placing weak or compromised men at its head. In 1938, however, he broke his own rule by appointing Beria. He may have felt that the great purges had thoroughly crushed his opposition, and it was obviously necessary to restore the efficiency and morale of the police, which had been decimated by the purges.

After the war, Stalin restricted Beria's power also. From 1946 on, Beria did not have direct control of the political police. At the 19th Party Congress in October, 1952, Beria was placed still lower in the hierarchy of favor, and, just before Stalin's death, the Doctors' Plot was "uncovered."

The charge that the police had failed to uncover so serious a plot against the state was obviously a charge directed at Beria. Beria's stock was at its lowest point.

Once Stalin was dead, Beria moved rapidly to protect himself. But he failed, because, in seeking to acquire enough power to assure his personal security, he threatened to bring about the very development that the early Bolshevik leaders had feared: the emergence of a strong man who was both chief of the political police and a powerful figure in the Soviet hierarchy. At worst, Beria might eliminate the whole collective leadership and assume Stalin's position. At best, his existence offered a constant temptation to one faction in the collective leadership to seek his aid in eliminating another faction. Therefore, Beria had to go. But this did not mean the end of the political police as a vital organ of the Soviet state; it only eliminated the threat that the police might become a policy-making organization.

At present, it seems that the power of the police over the Soviet population will continue, because the regime cannot do without a police system to protect itself against real or imagined enemies. But, so long as the leadership is a collective one, no Presidium member will be permitted to control the police, and no police chief will be allowed power or influence in the upper echelons of the Soviet government.

COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND THE POLITICAL
POLICE IN THE SOVIET UNION

Since the death of Stalin, the Soviet Union has undergone, and even now continues to undergo, some very striking changes. One of the most important of these has been the transformation of the role of the political police, a development that is closely interrelated with all the other changes that have occurred. The most dramatic incident in this transformation was the liquidation of Beria and several of his colleagues in 1953, followed by group executions of more police officials in 1954 and 1955. The MVD, which Beria had headed, was divided after his death into the MVD and the KGB; and the heads of these two organizations have been kept at a considerably lower level of prestige than their predecessor had enjoyed.

It is quite obvious that a radical change in an institution so essential to a dictatorship as the political police must be connected with the death of the dictator and the assumption of his powers by a group. The evidence shows that neither the continued existence of the political police nor its function as one of the instruments of Communist Party policy is the question at issue, and that, despite the change in the

relationship of the political police to the top political authorities, the police has lost none of its power over the Russian people.

Except in the few months of Beria's tenure after Stalin's death, the political police was never a participant in decision-making. The political leaders were always careful to keep it remote from high policy.¹

There were good reasons for doing so. First of all, it was a matter of efficiency to keep the political police free of other responsibilities, so that it would devote all its energies to the heavy task assigned it: to serve as the instrument of the Party in forcing its policies upon a recalcitrant nation. Also, the Party needed a scapegoat. Popular anger with Party policies would be vented against the organ of enforcement, and the Party could divert some of this anger from itself by keeping the police out of politics. Most important, if the police had participated in decision-making, it might have become a dangerous force. Precisely because the political police was such an important instrument of policy, it was unthinkable that it should participate in the framing of that policy. As long as the Politburo was a policy-making

1. Most of the data in the first part of this paper were provided by a reliable informant, who, in the 1920's and 1930's, was close to the personalities and events described.

organization and not Stalin's creature, no police chief could have been a member. Once the Politburo had become Stalin's tool, it was possible for a police chief, such as Beria, to be a member. Now that Stalin is dead, this has again become impossible.

The primary function of the political police has always been to maintain the Bolsheviks in power. The Cheka was created, within a month after the revolution, for the purpose of "defending the revolution" and preventing sabotage by internal enemies. Its first head, Dzherzhinsky, was well fitted for this task. He was a fanatical Communist with a warped and compulsive personality, who "defended the revolution" with ardor and was able, without remorse, to use terroristic methods.

Lenin made an effort to exclude the police from policy-making. It was generally known that Dzherzhinsky's lack of political ambition weighed heavily with Lenin in choosing him to head the Cheka. It was probably no accident that Dzherzhinsky, a member of the Central Committee before the Cheka was created, was never considered for full membership in the Politburo. He was elected a candidate to the Politburo in 1924, but in that position he played only an advisory role and had no decisive voice in policy-making.

Until Beria's death, all chiefs of the police, except Yezhov, had been of non-Russian origin. They were therefore more likely to arouse the hatred of the populace, and less eligible for promotion to policy-making posts, than Great Russian officials would have been. Dzherzhinsky, in particular, disqualified himself for any political post by his ill-concealed hatred of Great Russians.

The Politburo's practice of making the police a scapegoat further isolated the police from the decision-making area of the Soviet government. For example, the Bolsheviks have preserved the fiction that the Cheka murdered the Romanov family on its own initiative. However, Trotsky's papers contain documentary proof that the assassination, which appalled all Russians, had been ordered by the Politburo.

Though kept out of policy-making, the political police nevertheless made a constant effort to extend its activities. Though created to "defend the revolution" and "prevent sabotage," the Cheka also concerned itself with crimes committed by employees in the course of their daily work, with desertion from the army, and with banditry and speculation. By 1920, its field of operation was very large, and it had acquired a

large degree of autonomy from the central government. The chaotic situation in Russia at that time was responsible for this extension of its power. In order to "defend the revolution," it was necessary to hold together a tottering economy and political structure. The political police seemed to be the only effective instrument of control. There was so much that required controlling that the power of the police inevitably expanded.

Lenin seemed to be alert to the problem. In 1922 he insisted that, as the Bolshevik regime approached stability in power, it was necessary to create "revolutionary legality" and "to narrow the sphere of activity" of the Cheka.²

As long as Lenin lived, the political police never reached a position where it could challenge the authority of the Party. In this respect, too, Lenin's choice of Dzherzhinsky was wise. For Dzherzhinsky was completely subservient to the Party. The Party often ruled against him when he made charges, usually violent ones, against government or Party officials. Dzherzhinsky never contested such Party decisions but received them with humility. His attachment

2. V.I. Lenin, Sochinenie, 4th ed., Vol. 33, p. 150.

to the Party was nearly religious; he considered partiinost (party spirit) to be a means of salvation. When elected to the Central Committee of the Party in 1917, he declared himself unworthy of the honor.

Lenin appeared to be convinced that, so long as the Cheka was in Dzherzhinsky's hands, it would never become a threat to the regime. But Dzherzhinsky was mortal, and it might not have been possible to find an equally trustworthy successor. Moreover, he exposed himself to unnecessary risks in making dangerous arrests personally.

It was generally believed in Party circles that the reforms and reorganization of the political police in 1920 and 1922 were instituted in anticipation of a time when it might be headed by a less dependable servant than Dzherzhinsky.

The police was reorganized and renamed "GPU" on February 6, 1922.³ At the same time, it was proclaimed that the stability of the regime now permitted a limitation of the power of the police. Thus, for example, warrants of arrest and search orders were thenceforth to be approved by the Commissariat of Justice. No doubt the reforms were intended to make the functions of the police conform more closely with the relaxed atmosphere which accompanied the New Economic Policy.

3. Sobranie Uzakonenie RSFSR, 1922, No. 16, p. 160. "GPU" is the abbreviation for Gosudarstvennoe Politicheskoe Upravlenie (State Political Administration).

None of the reforms, however, actually curbed police activity. For example, the obtaining of warrants and search orders was considerably facilitated by having an official from the Commissariat of Justice attached directly to the GPU. Moreover, an earlier law, which gave extraordinary powers to the Cheka,⁴ was not repealed, and, in effect, it largely nullified the new decree. Under it, the Cheka had been given the right to arrest, deport, or execute any persons who were caught red-handed in espionage, counterrevolution, or banditry.

The only practical ameliorative result of the reform and reorganization was a purge of the police organization. Most of those removed were guilty either of graft or of committing atrocities during the terror.

To some extent the purge reassured the population, for it raised hopes that, with the end of the Civil War and the beginning of the New Economic Policy, the regime might actually have become so secure that it would no longer feel it necessary to use the police to terrorize the nation.

4. "O Vserossiiskoi Cherezvychainoi Komissii," Sobranie Uzakonenie RSFSR, 1919, No. 12, p. 130.

The terror did indeed diminish, but the political police (with its name changed to OGPU⁵ in 1923) continued to enjoy a semi-autonomous status in the Soviet system. The early concern of Bolshevik leaders to keep Party and police apart now began to have consequences which substituted another danger for the one they had sought to avoid. By keeping police and Party separate, the Bolsheviks had sought to preserve the Party from the stigma of police operations. The remoteness of the police only increased its usefulness to the Party, since the police, rather than the Party, bore the brunt of the resentment engendered by police actions. But as the police came to be stronger and its functions wider, this very separation threatened to make the police an increasingly independent body -- a problem which to this very day has remained one of the Party's most serious concerns.

Dzherzhinsky himself had seen the dangers inherent in too great an isolation from the Party:

As long as the Cheka is an organ of the Central Committee it is a revolutionary organ; without the Central Committee the Cheka will become counterrevolutionary.⁶

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5. United State Political Administration (Obedinnennoi Gosudarstvennoe Politicheskoe Upravlenie). The word "United" was added when the organization incorporated several agencies which had not been part of it before.
 6. Menzhinsky, O Dzherzhinskom, Moscow, 1933, p. 14.

The GPU had a Party Committee, but, unlike such committees in all other Soviet organizations, it played only a minor role, and its activity was limited to educational matters. Normally, Party groups in the various Soviet organizations review and criticize the performance of Party members within those organizations by having the work of individual Party members discussed at meetings of the Party cell. In the GPU, however, security rules made it impossible for one GPU member to know the intimate details of another's work. Compartmentalization within even the smallest working unit was a firm principle of the organization that conducted espionage against its own people. Thus, the Party Committee was debarred both from the central decision-making area of the GPU and from the review of operations of the lower echelons, and Party discipline could not be enforced. All important matters were dealt with by the Collegium (the supreme policy-making organ of the GPU), from whose verdict there was practically no appeal. In fact, the usual right of any Party member to appeal to the Central Committee was denied to members of the GPU. Any such appeal would have been regarded as a breach

of Chekistkaia Etika (Cheka honor), since the verdict of the Collegium was regarded as a judgment of comrades over comrades. The members of the GPU were as much afraid of the Collegium as the population was afraid of the GPU, and the Party Committee had no way of interfering with the Collegium. On the other hand, the Collegium, which had absolute power over the members of the police and very large power over the population, and was only theoretically limited by the Commissariat of Justice, was not as yet able to proceed against a Party member outside the organization without the permission of the Party Control Commission.

By 1923 the OGPU had become considerably more powerful as a result of having acquired numerous additional functions. It had incorporated the Border Defense (Pogranichnaia Okhrana), which led to a large increase in personnel and the creation of a tremendous apparatus, and had taken over the Transport Defense (Transportnaia Okrana), which protects railroad and water communications throughout the U.S.S.R. Moreover, it was given responsibility for the secret agencies in the army in all military districts. Also, the Comintern's secret missions abroad were transferred to the OGPU. In addition to

these new and important responsibilities, the OGPU remained in control of the civil police departments in all Soviet republics, of the passport division, the department of criminal investigations, the fire departments, the files of vital statistics and registration of citizens (ZAGS), and the administration of prisons and labor camps.

The OGPU continued what had been the principal function of the Cheka, namely, to guard against counterrevolution. But it had undergone a significant transformation in having become a large administrative organ, with many responsibilities that are not necessarily associated with the police. The reform which had been advertised as a move to limit the power of the Cheka actually had the opposite effect of leaving the OGPU with more power than the Cheka had ever had.

Still, the OGPU did not as yet have control over Party members outside the organization itself, for Dzherzhinsky still clung to his original idea that the OGPU should be a servant of the Party and a defender of the revolution.

But there was a growing danger of a genuine competition between Party and police, not only as a result of the increased powers of the police, but also because of changes in the nature

of the Party itself, which were beginning to undermine its position of superiority over the police. In the first place, the Party was being weakened by controversies among the top leaders. In the second place, the drive to "build socialism" had resulted in a dissipation of the Party's control over its membership. As Party members entered state industrial and agricultural organs to effect the "building of socialism," it became more and more difficult for the Central Control Committee of the Party to keep watch over the dispersed members. Furthermore, the participation of Party organizations in state organs brought about a certain equalization between Party and state, and control over Party members began to slip from the hands of the Central Control Committee.

At first, the police was forbidden to conduct intelligence operations against and make arrests of Party members, and these legal restrictions were actually enforced. But even before the prestige of the Party had deteriorated to the point at which the police acquired the legal right to maintain a watch over Party members, it had been doing so unofficially for some time. As the OGPU began to extend its control over Party members, Party leaders and even many of the rank-and-file

members became conscious of the danger that the OGPU might become a political force. They understood that, if the police, through its control over Party members, were to grow into an arbiter of ideological matters, it might come to control the Party.

Even Dzherzhinsky could not stem this development. Though he had been opposed to the GPU's participation in Party controversies, he let himself be convinced by Stalin that the existence of the Party was being threatened by Stalin's political opponents, and that, therefore, the use of the police against members of the opposition would not violate Party democracy. Once persuaded, Dzherzhinsky became a tool in Stalin's hands. His successors proved even more malleable.

There is no doubt that Stalin was aware of the threat to his own position that resulted from the development of the political police from an instrument of the Party into an instrument used by one faction of the Party against another. He had opened the floodgates, and his problem for the rest of his life was to be how to control the flood.

At the height of the purges of the 'thirties, the NKVD chief, Yezhov, accused his predecessor, Yagoda, of planning to become a Fouché.⁷ The audience gasped at this remark. Fouché, they knew, had started as a revolutionist, participated in the conspiracy against Robespierre, become Napoleon's minister of the interior, and finally, when Napoleon's fortunes declined, had intrigued against him too, and ended up serving the Bourbon Louis XVIII. Yezhov's listeners would not have been surprised to hear that Yagoda had been a thief or even an agent of the Tsarist police (although he would have been ten years old at the time of the latter crime). But to accuse so pliant and unambitious a man as Yagoda of seeking to use the police to unseat Stalin was obvious nonsense. The audience knew that Stalin was speaking through Yezhov, and they gasped at the revelation that Stalin feared that the organ he himself had used to eliminate his own rivals might, in turn, be used to eliminate him.

7. W. G. Krivitsky, In Stalin's Secret Service, New York, 1939, pp. 156-158.

In the period between Dzherzhinsky's death and the appointment of Beria, Stalin tried to control the danger from the political police largely by placing weak or compromised men at its head. Of Dzherzhinsky's immediate successor, Menzhinsky, Trotsky wrote:

At the front I was once visited by Menzhinsky. I had known him for a long time. In the years of the reaction he belonged to a group of the extreme left, or the Vperedtsi as they were called from the name of their paper (Bogdanov, Lunacharsky, and others). [He had met Menzhinsky in 1910.]...The impression he made on me could best be described by saying that he made none at all. He seemed more like the sketch of an unfinished portrait. There are such people. Only now and then would an ingratiating smile, or a secret play of the eyes, betray his eagerness to emerge from his insignificance. I do not know what his conduct was in the October days, or whether he had any at all. But after the seizure of power, in the hustle and bustle of the period he was sent to the Ministry of Finance. He showed no active enterprise on his own, or only enough to reveal his incompetence. Later on, Dzherzhinsky took him over. Dzherzhinsky was a man of tremendous will, passion and high moral tension. His figure dominated the Cheka. No one took any notice of Menzhinsky, so quietly toiling away over his papers. It was not until Dzherzhinsky toward the end of his life parted company with Unschlicht that he suggested appointing Menzhinsky to the vacant post, not being able to find anyone else. The proposal caused general surprise. "But who else?" Dzherzhinsky said in excuse, "There is no one." But Stalin supported Menzhinsky.... Stalin generally gave his support to people who existed politically only through the grace of the government apparatus. And so Menzhinsky became the thorough shadow of Stalin in the GPU. After Dzherzhinsky's death, Menzhinsky became not only the head of the GPU, but a member of the Central Committee as well. Thus may the shadow of an unrealized man pass on the bureaucratic scene for that of a real one.⁸

8. Leon Trotsky, My Life, New York, 1931, p. 450.

Menzhinsky's successor was Yagoda, Stalin's personal choice. Stalin knew that Yagoda had had dealings with the Right Opposition, but he probably considered this to be advantageous rather than disqualifying; for when it came time to liquidate Yagoda, Stalin used Yagoda's former rightist connections to good advantage. Yagoda was weak and completely subservient to Stalin's will, without Dzherzhinsky's passion and devotion to the cause. He was not popular in his own services. He often antagonized chiefs of divisions because he neither knew nor would have been able to understand the cliques and countercliques in the organization. Although he lived in the same building with his subordinates, he did not associate with them for fear of antagonizing someone. He tried to keep aloof from the intrigues and cliques against him that grew up in the organization and to stick close to Stalin, unaware that many of those intrigues were inspired by Stalin's Secretariat, where every move of Yagoda's was reported by some of his subordinates. It must have been a shock to him when Stalin pushed him aside and personally conducted the investigation which followed the assassination of Kirov on December 1, 1934. As Krivitsky

describes the episode:

That same evening the chief of the OGPU, Yagoda, also left Moscow for Leningrad to take over the investigation in his line of duty. There had already been rumors of a coolness between Stalin and Yagoda, but that night marked the beginning of an open break between them. Stalin endeavored in every way to keep Yagoda from questioning the assassin and his associates.⁹

By taking over the investigation personally, and enlisting the aid of the State Prosecutor rather than of the police, Stalin demonstrated his personal distrust of both Yagoda and the NKVD. Although Yagoda still played an important role in the preparation of the trials, he was not acting independently but always on orders from Stalin. Stalin could not have carried out the great purges without the NKVD, but the decisive and most dangerous phase -- the execution of Red Army generals -- was conducted by the NKVD after that organization itself had been purged, and after Yagoda had been removed and replaced by Yezhov.

In appointing Yezhov to head the NKVD, Stalin clearly demonstrated the control of Stalin's Party apparatus over the political police. Yezhov, although hardly known outside the Party apparatus, had directed the personnel department of the

9. Krivitsky, op.cit., pp. 184-185.

Central Committee since 1935. In that capacity Yezhov not only was thoroughly aware of the key positions occupied by Party members all over the country, but was in charge of the supervision and surveillance of leading Party organs. During his stay in office, he built up a file on all Party organizations and their members in preparation for the great purges of 1936-38. This activity of Yezhov, who was personally responsible to Stalin, was not known in the Party, but it was watched with misgivings by the NKVD, where Yezhov's apparatus was referred to as "Stalin's personal NKVD " and Stalin himself was called "the best Chekist." Members of the NKVD, fearing the "parallel police," reacted in self-protection by forming cliques within the organization that spied upon and denounced one another to the Control Committee, of which Yezhov was a member. Yezhov diligently collected for Stalin all the derogatory information about Yagoda which the latter's subordinates furnished. The subordinates were poorly rewarded; when Yagoda fell, they were themselves replaced by Yezhov's collaborators, and many of them were purged.

When Yezhov replaced Yagoda as chief of the NKVD, Vyshinsky was promoted to the post of State Prosecutor, and Stalinist sycophants were thus in control of both police and courts.

Yezhov was given free rein to carry out the great purges. He went to work furiously, sparing neither friend nor foe of his predecessor. His collaborators believed him to be insane. Krivitsky reports that, in an interview with him in the summer of 1937, Yezhov was incoherent, his conversation shifting rapidly from threats and violent outbursts to indecent anecdotes and fits of laughter. He finally suffered a complete nervous breakdown and was committed to an asylum.

It was widely believed that Yezhov's madness was largely responsible for the extremes which the purges reached, and that Yezhov had exceeded Stalin's orders. However, this seems doubtful; for Stalin, though he had the power to stop Yezhov at any point, did not choose to replace him until his insanity incapacitated him. It is more probable that Beria, who replaced Yezhov in 1938, persuaded Stalin to call off the terror.

Beria, a high official in the police and himself a survivor of the purges, knew best the extent of the damage inflicted on the police by Yagoda and Yezhov. His first concern was to reassure the survivors of the purges, and to rehabilitate the NKVD organization as quickly as possible. In order to carry out the reforms he considered necessary, Beria needed a confident and loyal staff. To this end he had first to restore the independence of the political police from Stalin's private police apparatus.

In choosing Beria, Stalin broke his own rule that the chief of the political police be a weak man. He may have felt that the massive opposition to his dictatorship had been thoroughly crushed, and that therefore he no longer needed to maintain the absolute personal control over the police which he had exercised during the purges. More probably, however, he was alarmed at the depraved and demoralized state of the NKVD. After the devastation wrought by the purges, Stalin no doubt realized the necessity to restore order and efficiency to the Soviet structure, and the police must have seemed to him an obvious candidate for restoration.

Beria was a good choice for that task. Calm, intelligent, and a good administrator, he was well equipped to restore order and sanity in the organization. Most important of all, from Stalin's viewpoint, Beria was willing to devote his energies to keeping Stalin in power. Stalin probably trusted him more than he had trusted his predecessors. Also, after his victories over the opposition and the relative ease with which he had disposed of Yagoda and Yezhov, Stalin must have felt confident that, should the need arise, he would be able to deal with Beria too. For the time being, Stalin

considered the support of Beria essential to his personal power as well as to the successful conversion of the Soviet economy into a war economy, and he therefore granted Beria greater power than any of his predecessors had enjoyed. Beria used this power to build a police apparatus calculated, first of all, to maintain Stalin's supreme position and, secondly, to assist in making the Soviet state into a viable and productive concern.

His first step was to restore the separation of police and party, which Lenin and his comrades had considered a healthy arrangement. But there were several differences between this new NKVD and the old Cheka, and between Beria and Dzherzhinsky.

Dzherzhinsky had followed Lenin's wishes in keeping the police separate from the Party, and had seen its salvation in a close but subordinate relation to the Party; his problem had been to prevent the police from growing into an uncontrollable monster. Stalin, when he became the undisputed leader of the Party, had used the police not to "defend the revolution" but to liquidate his enemies, and this had seriously demoralized the police. Beria now sought to sever the police from the Party

once more, in order to save the police from further demoralization. His problem was to cage and domesticate the monster which Stalin had allowed to grow and get out of hand.

Another difference between the two men was that Dzherzhinsky had sincerely believed that he was serving the Party, when actually he was serving only Stalin. Beria, on the other hand, consciously and loyally served Stalin.

But, as an efficient administrator, Beria apparently felt that he could serve Stalin better if he controlled a unified and independent NKVD, whose first loyalty was to Beria himself. For this purpose he undoubtedly could see no need for a Party organization to serve as intermediary between himself and Stalin.

In the beginning of Beria's career as police chief, Stalin evidently agreed with Beria's ideas on how best to serve Stalin and his interests. (We shall see that, ultimately, Stalin was to become fearful of the power he himself had given Beria.) At first, however, he granted him more power than any previous police chief had held, not only over the NKVD but also in other important posts. In 1938, shortly after Beria had taken over

the NKVD, Stalin nominated him to the War Council. On June 30, 1941, he was made a charter member of the State Defense Committee (GKO). The position of power and influence which Beria had reached by that time can be measured by the fact that Mikoyan and Vosnesensky were not appointed to the State Defense Committee until February 1942, Kaganovich was appointed still later in 1942, and Bulganin only in November 1944. Beria also acquired considerable influence as the manager of a huge economic program of construction and armament projects administered by the NKVD. This type of NKVD activity became much more significant under Beria than it had been under any of his predecessors, involving an ever increasing number of slave laborers.

Despite his trust in Beria's loyalty, Stalin apparently developed some misgivings about the quick accretion of Beria's powers. Moreover, Stalin was incapable of placing complete trust in anyone. This is probably the principal explanation for the split in the NKVD on February 3, 1941, which essentially separated the secret-police functions from the overt administrative and economic activities. The former were entrusted to Beria's former deputy, V.K. Merkulov, who became head of the New Commissariat for State Security (NKGB). Beria remained head of the NKVD.

The two organizations were again merged into a unified NKVD six months later, at the outbreak of the war, and Beria was once more put in charge of the entire organization. But this last organizational change must be regarded as having been due only to the emergency of war. For in April of 1943, when the military crisis had passed, the NKVD was again split into the same two separate organizations that had been established in February, 1941. This separation continued until Stalin's death; the only change occurred in 1946, when the "peoples commissariats" were renamed "ministries," and became the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and Ministry of State Security (MGB), respectively.

There is little doubt that Stalin divided the powers of the political police in order to prevent Beria from becoming too powerful. In the first split, Beria probably lost very little of his position, since the head of the new NKGB, Merkulov, was apparently close and loyal to him. (The evidence for Merkulov's loyalty to Beria, though indirect, is persuasive in the atmosphere of Soviet political life. The fact that he was liquidated in 1953 along with Beria indicates that his liquidators believed him to have been Beria's man.)

Moreover, Beria apparently continued to have some over-all responsibility for both organizations even after the split, and he, of course, resumed control over the reunified NKVD during the war crisis. But in the reorganization of 1946, Beria was not made the head of either the MVD or the MGB; S.N. Kruglov headed the former, V.S. Abakumov the latter. Beria is generally believed to have retained general supervision of both organs, but there is no definite proof of this. He no doubt maintained a good deal of influence, if not control, over the MGB, since Abakumov was dependent on him and a loyal collaborator. (Abakumov was executed in 1954 for having been so close to Beria.) But Beria probably lost much influence in the MVD, whose head, Kruglov, seems never to have been close to or dependent on Beria -- an assumption that is strengthened by the fact that he retained his position as head of the MVD for two-and-a-half years after Beria's arrest. As of now, there is no indication that Kruglov's removal in February, 1956, had any connection with his previous association with Beria.

During the remainder of his lifetime, Stalin was able to maneuver in such a way as to prevent Beria from attaining

a position of power which might threaten Stalin's own supremacy. His handling of this problem clearly highlights one essential difference between the one-man dictatorship of Stalin and the uncertainly balanced collective leadership of his successors. Stalin could rely on Beria to support him in his position, at the same time that he employed his single-channeled authority to prevent Beria from challenging him. The collective leaders who succeeded Stalin, on the other hand, could not depend upon Beria to support the group as a whole in power; nor could a group with disparate interests manipulate and control him with the singleness of purpose that Stalin as an individual was able to.

In the last few months of his life, Stalin displayed the skill with which he could outmaneuver and undercut a chief of the political police who had become too powerful for comfort. At the 19th Party Congress, in October of 1952, Beria found himself scheduled to give his speech on the afternoon of the third day -- a considerable slight to his prestige. He suffered another blow when his reliable cohort, Abakumov, failed to be re-elected to the Central Committee,

after having been removed from his post as minister of the MGB. Another henchman, Dekanozov, was also dropped from the Central Committee. And all the while, both before and after the 1952 Congress, Beria was being confronted with purges of the political police, the victims of which turned out to be his own supporters.

The changes in personnel appointments made at the 1952 Congress not only indicated a decline in Beria's power, but hinted at collaboration between Khrushchev and Malenkov in arranging for Beria's eclipse. One of Stalin's most effective techniques was to create cliques among his entourage for the purpose of having them conspire against one of its members. It was natural that Malenkov and Khrushchev should have been amenable to such a conspiracy, for, like all their colleagues, they had reason to fear the consequences of Beria's becoming too powerful. This must have been particularly true as Stalin was becoming old and, though no one may have expected him to die within less than six months, the problem of his succession was undoubtedly much on the minds of his associates. If Beria retained his dual position of power in the Politburo and as head of the police, he would be

in an almost unchallengeable position should Stalin die. As for Stalin himself, it was characteristic of his personality that he should distrust Beria and seek to curb his powers. Regardless of whether Beria in fact had any ambitions to succeed Stalin or perhaps even to displace him, Stalin was bound to suspect that he did, and to react in accordance with his fears.

Nothing in Stalin's actions in 1952 indicated that he had any intention of curbing the power of the police itself. All his moves seemed to arise merely out of the fear of becoming too dependent upon the support of a powerful chief of police. One essential element of continuity between the Stalinist regime and that of his successors has been that neither has sought to reduce the power of the police as such, but that both have found it necessary to keep that power out of the hands of a single strong figure. This problem was less difficult for Stalin, who had both will and authority to cope with it, and did so in the last months of his life. His successors, however, found it necessary to solve the problem by more drastic means than even Stalin may have contemplated.

The most ominous sign that Stalin was determined to undermine his loyal but too-powerful servant was the Doctors' Plot, which was revealed on January 13, 1953. At the Congress, three months before, Malenkov had hinted that there were enemies within the Soviet society; he probably had no idea that his remark would be blown up into an allegation of an actual plot which came close to implicating him. Beria, no doubt in self-protection, had countered with the argument that the only enemies were from the capitalist world.

The accusations against the doctors clearly implied that there were indeed enemies within the Soviet state. A group of Soviet doctors were charged not only with having murdered Shcherbakov and Zhdanov, but with having planned to kill high-ranking Soviet army officers. As the accused doctors would not themselves have taken the initiative for such crimes, the obvious implication was that someone had instigated and directed their alleged murderous activities.

The ramifications of the Doctors' Plot are numerous and complex. Students of Soviet affairs have yet to unravel all

of the possible interpretations of its meaning. Perhaps Stalin's primary purpose in setting the stage for a purge was to contrive an acid test of the loyalty of his entourage. Those who co-operated with him in this dangerous venture would thereby have committed themselves so far that they would subsequently have no choice but to continue Stalin's line. Those who resisted would be liquidated as the purge progressed. In any event, the scheme was certainly not directed solely against Beria. But for the purposes of this paper we shall discuss only those aspects of the purge that relate to Beria.

Beria's position was clearly threatened by the charges. He was not, as Yagoda had been, charged directly with responsibility for the murders. But if the affair had not been aborted by Stalin's death, Beria would have been at least as likely a candidate for such an accusation as anyone else. As it was, Beria was very seriously injured by the charges against the doctors; for the indictment, which stated that the police had been negligent in permitting the plot to develop, obviously reflected upon him. One of the alleged victims,

Shcherbakov, had died in 1945, when Beria was still head of the MVD; and whether or not Beria had retained a supervisory role over the MVD and MGB after 1946, it was "his man" Abakumov who had been head of the MGB at the time that most of the alleged negligence occurred.

Another aspect of this episode suggests that the political police, and presumably Beria, were intended to be the principal losers in the shake-up that was bound to follow such serious charges. There must be some significance in the fact that the intended "victims" were all army officers, who, according to the charges, had nearly suffered destruction because the political police failed to protect them. The choice of these victims may have been calculated to avoid any possible unity of action or purpose between the police and the army, and thus to isolate the political police still further.

These moves had all the earmarks of well-known Stalinist divisive tactics. There is no way of proving, of course, that Stalin personally conceived the idea of the Doctors' Plot or planned the blood purge that was almost bound to follow. But since the tactics were so typical of Stalin, and since Stalin was about the only person who could not be implicated in the charges, he was probably the principal if not the sole architect of the scheme.

We may assume that Stalin deliberately used the case to injure Beria in order to eliminate him as a possible rival. For, if Stalin had a premonition of his own death (assuming that it was due to natural causes), he may have been concerned that "Stalinism" might not survive him because, unlike himself, none of his heirs would be able to cope with the political police if Beria remained a powerful figure in the Soviet hierarchy. We are, of course, assuming that he was firmly opposed to the idea of Beria's inheriting his mantle. Certainly, in the last months of his life Stalin was preparing another purge, and it seems evident to us that he intended Beria to be at least one of the victims.¹⁰

Soon after Stalin died, those of his successors who were most implicated in the Doctors' Plot quickly undertook to extricate themselves from it. Beria was apparently the most precipitous and emphatic in doing so, no doubt because he was most seriously involved. Perhaps because he was acting in desperation, his efforts to restore his position were

10. We are indebted to our colleague Robert C. Tucker for an interpretation of the events surrounding the developing purge and the circumstances of Stalin's death.

excessive. He not only regained his position; he quickly acquired more power than he had ever had before. Though it was to be too short-lived to become effective, it was enough to frighten his colleagues. For the first time in Soviet history, the development which the early Bolshevik leaders had feared had become reality: a strong personality was both chief of the political police and a powerful figure in the Soviet hierarchy. What Stalin had been able to prevent, the collective leadership was unable to handle.

The first overt move of Beria (or at least one for which he must be assumed to have been primarily responsible) was to combine the MVD and the MGB under his leadership, within days after Stalin's death.¹¹ This merger re-established the situation that had existed in July, 1941, at the beginning of the Soviet-German war.

The manner in which Beria arranged this consolidation of his power remains a mystery which it is almost idle to guess about. Perhaps it was merely part of the general governmental reorganization that occurred immediately after Stalin's death. Several other ministries were combined and

11. Pravda, March 6, 1953.

put directly under the control of various members of the Presidium. Beria's colleagues may have felt that what they were allotting to themselves they could not easily deny to Beria. Yet the concentration of police power in the hands of a single member of the Presidium was quite different from the consolidation of several economic ministries under one member of the top leadership.

Possibly, the new collective leadership combined the police functions and put them into Beria's hands for reasons similar to those obtaining in July, 1941. Stalin's death confronted them with a serious crisis. By their own admission, they feared panic and confusion. They may have considered the Bolshevik regime to be in at least as much danger, from both external and internal enemies, as it had been in 1941. Therefore, they may have felt that, for the moment, Beria's ability to cope with these immediate dangers, be they real or imagined, far outweighed the more remote danger of his becoming too powerful, and this may have led them to permit, or perhaps even to initiate, his promotion.

Or, Beria may have had the support of one or several of his colleagues, whose influence outweighed any objections that other leaders may have had to granting Beria increased powers. His most likely supporter at that juncture would have been Malenkov. For, although there were hints that in the autumn of 1952 Malenkov had collaborated with Khrushchev in attempting to undermine Beria, there were also signs that Khrushchev may have abandoned Malenkov in the two months before Stalin's death. Since one of the alleged victims of the Doctors' Plot had been Malenkov's former enemy Zhdanov, there was at least a possibility of Malenkov's being implicated in the charges. Khrushchev, who himself had nothing to fear from the plot, would seem to have abandoned Malenkov as one whom he believed doomed to destruction. He may even have collaborated with Stalin in preparing a purge aimed at both Malenkov and Beria. And Malenkov, if he felt himself threatened, may naturally have turned to one who had at his disposal so powerful an instrument as the political police.

The suggestion that their common danger may have drawn Malenkov and Beria together as early as January, 1953, is further strengthened by the fact that both landed on the top

immediately after Stalin's death. Also, they may well have been instrumental in the sudden stopping, hardly two weeks before Stalin died, of the violent campaign against intellectuals and Jews, which had been an important part of the buildup for the alleged Doctors' Plot.

But, regardless of whether Beria and Malenkov were in alliance before Stalin's death, they evidently were for a few weeks afterward.

As mentioned above, the first step in consolidating Beria's power was the reuniting of the MVD and the MGB under his leadership.

Beria's second dramatic step toward consolidating his power was the repudiation of the Doctors' Plot, which was announced on April 4, 1953. This reversal exonerated not only Beria, but many MGB officials as well. It would seem to have been not only an attempt by Beria to extricate himself from the charges of negligence, but also one of several desperate moves in the spring of 1953 to win back his control over the police which Stalin had undermined months earlier.

Beria's behavior from that point forward, however, must have alarmed Malenkov as much as it did the other members of the Presidium. Beria's elbowing for power was so violent that Malenkov was compelled to abandon him in order to save himself. If there was an alliance between the two men, it was shortlived as a result of Beria's compulsive behavior. That Beria should have risked antagonizing the man who may have been his only ally is further evidence that he was acting in desperation.

Beria's next step was to consolidate himself within his own organization. This was a difficult task because he had lost much ground there while Stalin was alive. As suggested above, Stalin had been deliberately undercutting Beria toward the end of 1952 by removing his friends from various police posts. But even before, in the years between 1946 and 1952, Beria had lost touch with the most vital parts of the MVD and MGB as a result of having been mainly absorbed in the industrial activities of the MVD, particularly in the large defense projects which it controlled.

Beria's method of securing his position in the political police was to place as many of his trusted friends as possible in responsible posts. First, he reorganized the MGB (renamed

GUGB -- Glavnoe Upravlenie Gosudarstvennoi Bezopastnosti)

and placed it under Kobulov, who, according to information from defectors, had come to Moscow with him in 1938 and had been one of his closest collaborators. Beria also put several of "his" men in positions of power in the provinces, such as Meshik in the Ukraine and Dekanozov in Georgia. In the process, he may have offended some of his colleagues on the Presidium whose friends were displaced by his. For example, Melnikov, who was ousted in the Ukraine, may have been closely associated with Kaganovich, who in 1947 had appointed him to his first important Party post in the Ukraine.

Beria may have doubted his own ability to consolidate his control over the police, or he may have believed that such consolidation was insufficient to insure his continued political career, for he associated himself with the collective leadership's campaign to court popular favor. In the spring of 1953 the new regime made several moves that were obviously calculated to ingratiate the collective leadership with the Soviet people. Beria aligned himself with this campaign with eagerness and alacrity.

The reversal of the charges against the doctors was the first important step in that direction. There is no doubt that the intelligentsia and the bureaucracy had watched with dread the development of those charges, which to them must have been reminiscent of the revelations that led up to the purges of the late 1930's. With the sense that another purge was impending, which might reach the proportions of the earlier ones, nobody could feel safe. The reversal, therefore, must have brought tremendous relief to the upper levels of Soviet society, and Beria probably was given the major share of the credit.

In another bid for popularity, the top leaders took measures to please the nationalistic ego of the national minorities in the U.S.S.R. The Soviet press and theoretical journals were suddenly filled with articles on the friendship between the Great Russians and other nationalities, and urged the eradication of "remnants of chauvinism." Beria seems to have been the prime mover in this campaign. His chief method of conciliating the national minorities, however, was to replace Great Russians with natives in important administrative posts in the national republics. Thus he succeeded in filling the leading positions in Georgia, Azerbaidzhan, and Uzbekistan

with new men of his choice: Bakradze, Bagirov, and Yusupov. If the men displaced by these three had any friends among the other members of the Presidium, Beria's action may have antagonized his colleagues still further.

Next, Beria tried to enhance his popularity by holding out the prospect that the Soviet Union would be more humane in its control over the population. Changes in the criminal code and an amnesty were promised. The "Special Conference" of the MVD, a secret tribunal which passed sentence on political offenders without trial, was abolished. (Although the abolition of this dread police organ was not made public at the time, it was widely known within the Soviet Union.¹²) The Border Troops -- symbol of a barbed-wire fence confining Soviet citizens -- were transferred from the political police to the Ministry of Defense. Pravda offered hope to Soviet citizens that they would be given greater social and national freedom.¹³ Though it cannot be proved that Beria alone was responsible for the promised liberality of the new regime,

12. The measure was announced three years later (Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo, No. 1, 1956, p. 3). The announcement specified only the year 1953 as the date of the abolition; we are assuming that it occurred in the spring of that year.

13. "Soviet Socialist Justice," Pravda, April 6, 1953.

there is evidence that he associated himself with the new policy at an early date.¹⁴ It could be argued that the strategy was adopted by the new regime collectively in order to ingratiate the entire leadership with the Soviet people. It is even possible that Beria felt ambivalent about this policy, realizing that, if the promises were kept, some of the teeth of his organization would be pulled. On balance, however, Beria probably found the liberal policy weighted in his favor; for, if the promises had been carried out, he would no doubt have reaped more good will than any other leader, if only because, as the head of a relatively mild organ of control, he would have been far less frightening than as the chief of a feared and hated police.

Regardless of whether Malenkov and others shared responsibility for the promise of liberalization, one gets the impression by reading between the lines of the Soviet press that Beria received the lion's share of the credit for it. The amount of good will that these efforts engendered in the country at large should not be overemphasized, for the Soviet people have seen many promises broken and tend to be skeptical

14. In his speech at Stalin's funeral, Beria promised the Soviet people that their rights would be respected. The announcement reversing the charges against the doctors was issued by the MVD and contained the same promise, using the phraseology of Beria's speech.

of new ones. What is important is that at least some of the leaders felt it necessary to make the new regime more popular than Stalin's had been, and that in this popularity contest Beria apparently got ahead of his colleagues.

From the outset of his efforts to rehabilitate himself, Beria was fighting against odds. The army leaders, who seem to have been aligned against him at least as early as 1952, apparently remained alienated after Stalin's death. The fact that their rise in prestige began only after Beria's death would lend weight to the assumption that they had been opposed to him. In the spring of 1953, there were some signs that army and Party were in alliance against Beria. The alliance was reflected in the dispatch of army and Party personnel into the political police. This was an unusual maneuver, for which previously there had been no real necessity. Dzherzhinsky had been loyal to the Party; his successors had been loyal to Stalin, whom they viewed as the representative of the Party. Hence it had not been necessary to control the police by injecting alien personnel into its interstices. The rare expedient of procuring the assignment of army officers and of a number of the "most experienced comrades" from the

Party to the center of the police was tantamount to an open charge by Beria's opponents that Beria was not reliable. What is more, it proved that Beria was not strong enough to insist that the charge was groundless.

Perhaps it was the odds against him which made Beria move so precipitously in seeking more power and popularity. These two goals may have been contradictory; for his principal power resided in the police, and yet the promise of "justice and legality" which was at the basis of his quest for popularity implied limitations on the power of the police.

In the end, Beria's elbowing for power and his attempt to combine police functions with policy-making apparently upset the equilibrium of the collective leadership to the point where his colleagues reacted against him. Also, he probably seemed a convenient scapegoat for policies that had gone awry. The stance of relaxation of tension at home and abroad which the collective regime had assumed in the spring of 1953 had had unfavorable consequences. The Western powers were not softened up by the Soviet overtures, and the proposal for a Big-Four Conference was not accepted by the West. There were some outbreaks in the Satellites and a spectacular uprising of workers in East Germany.

On June 27, 1953, only a few days after the German revolt, Beria was conspicuously absent from a group of leaders attending the Bolshoi Theater. On July 10, 1953, Pravda announced that Beria had been removed from his post as First Deputy Premier and Minister of Internal Affairs. The article added that the case had been handed over to the Supreme Court for further examination. The resolution of the Plenum of the Central Committee, published at the same time, added that the decision concerning Beria had been taken "a few days ago" and approved by the Plenum. Beria's doom was shared by several of "his men": Goglidze, Kobulov, Dekanozov, and Meshik. Several other functionaries of the political police and the Ministries of Justice and State Control were purged at the same time. Most of the latter had been appointed while Beria was in control of the united political police, and most were non-Russians.

Beria and several of his associates were tried before a special tribunal of the Supreme Court on December 17, 1953, and sentenced to death for treason. It is perhaps significant that the Prosecutor as well as most of the judges were Ukrainians, or had been in the Ukraine during Khrushchev's time. Among

the judges there were at least one intended victim of the Doctors' Plot (Marshal Konev) and one Army General (Moskalenko). After Beria's execution, Moskalenko was to replace Artemev as commander of the Moscow Military District, a most important post, since a perennial concern in making this particular appointment was the ever-present fear that a coup d'état might have to be suppressed by the army garrison.

Among the charges in the indictment¹⁵ was an allegation that Beria had sabotaged the agrarian policy of the Party. This would seem to indicate that there had been friction between Beria and Khrushchev.

Though Beria was charged with having carried on intrigue against Ordzhonikidze, he was not accused of the latter's death. Nor did the indictment involve Beria in the sudden deaths of Zhdanov and Shcherbakov, the alleged victims of the Doctors' Plot. Thus there was no need to revive the Doctors' Plot in order to liquidate Beria. Incidentally, to have involved Beria in the alleged murders of Shcherbakov and Zhdanov might have had the double-edged effect of involving Malenkov as well.

15. Pravda, July 10, 1953.

It might be noted in passing that there still remains an unsprung trap in the Doctors' Plot. Someone can still be punished for fabricating it. Ignatiev, closely identified with Khrushchev, was publicly blamed for this sin when the charges of the plot were repudiated. But Ignatiev has been fully restored to a position of favor; he was elected to the Central Committee in March, 1956.

After Beria's removal, changes were made in the leadership of the political police which are indicative of the attitude of the present collective leadership toward that troublesome organ. The first step was to appoint as its new head S.N. Kruglov, a man who, though he had headed the MVD at the time of Stalin's death and had been close enough to Stalin to accompany him to the Teheran and Yalta conferences, had never acquired influence or power in the Soviet hierarchy. The second step was to reduce the stature of the state security element of the MVD (the former MGB, which under Beria had become the GUGB) through several shifts of MVD personnel in the provinces. In the Ukraine, for example, a former MGB man, Meshik, whom Beria had placed at the head of the Ukrainian MVD, was replaced by Strokach, who had held that position under Stalin. In

Azerbaidzhan, the same pattern was followed: Yemel'yanov, a former MGB minister whom Beria had made head of the local MVD, was replaced by Amiraslanov, whose previous career had been with the MVD. In some republics, such as Moldavia, Belorussia, and Esthonia, some MGB men who had been purged by Beria were reinstated. But, on balance, the new appointments resulted in an increase in the influence of people who had been associated with the MVD rather than the MGB, for Beria, in his struggle to consolidate his position, had apparently concentrated on staffing the GUGB (MGB) with his own supporters, thus strengthening himself in that part of the political police which enjoyed the real political power.

The next measure taken by the collective leadership to undo the work of Beria was again to split the political police into two parts. The reorganization occurred on March 13, 1954, with the creation of the Committee of State Security (KGB), followed by the setting up of similar committees in the Union Republics. The KGB is attached to the Council of Ministers and therefore seems to be entirely independent of the MVD.

Very little is known about the power and scope of the KGB. It is headed by Ivan Aleksandrovich Serov, who is reputed to have been Abakumov's deputy and a close collaborator of Beria. If the latter is true, it might mean that he was deliberately chosen because he was already compromised and therefore was expected to remain weak and controllable. Or, it could mean that he was Malenkov's choice and that Malenkov appointed him in a defensive move against Khrushchev. In any event, Serov has not risen to a position of prominence, despite a promotion in rank in August, 1955, and his elevation to the Central Committee of the Party in March, 1956. In the listings of Soviet figures on state occasions, which in the past have been rather faithful reflections of the hierarchic order, Serov is still being given lesser rank than were his predecessors. Though considerable power may reside in the KGB as such, its chief is apparently well under the control of the collective leadership.

All these moves seem to point to an attempt by the present leadership to restore as far as possible the relationship between the political police and the other organs of

government which had existed in the early years of Soviet power. The appointment of Dudorov as MVD chief -- a man without a police background but with a Party career -- emphasizes the subordination of the police to the Party leadership. A further illustration is the fact that the number of police officials who are members of the Central Committee of the Party has been reduced from ten in 1952 to only three in 1956; and one of these three is Dudorov, who became a police official only recently.

The exclusion of the police leaders from positions of supreme political power, and the consequent reduction of their political influence, must have been the result of some kind of agreement among the members of the ruling clique who saw their own interests menaced. Immediately after Stalin's death, Beria may have been granted the extensive powers he received partly because of his insistent claim to an equal share of Stalin's heritage, and partly because his colleagues, in their initial feeling of insecurity, may have felt the need of a strong police with a strong chief to protect them against domestic and foreign enemies. But they must have realized very soon that a collective leadership

could not control such a powerful police chief so effectively as Stalin as an individual leader had been able to. In the first place, Beria had been devoted to Stalin and his interests. The same kind of devotion cannot be commanded by a group. Beria's loyalty would necessarily be weighted in favor of one or two individuals in the group, causing the other members of the Presidium -- trained in Stalin's school as they were -- to suspect the formation of a cabal and to become distrustful of one another. In the second place, Stalin's authority and singleness of will had made it possible for him to cut short the excessive ambitions of any individual in his entourage by arranging combinations of his colleagues against him. No group could maneuver in this way. For these reasons, the collective leadership could not cope with so powerful a police chief as Beria.

One can imagine Beria's colleagues gravely discussing the problems he had created for the group and reaching an agreement among themselves to remove Beria from his position as head of the police. One can further speculate that, when they confronted Beria with their decision, he resisted, and that the more he resisted the more his colleagues -- all of them by now

combined against him -- suspected him of plotting against the group or against individuals within it. It is conceivable that in the beginning only persuasion was used against Beria, and that when he was recalcitrant and countered with his "liberal" policy, the conflict built up to a point where his liquidation was the only possible solution. The purpose of this hypothetical reconstruction of the manner in which Beria may have been doomed is to illustrate that, in a collective leadership, the combination in the hands of one man of political power and control over the political police will almost inevitably rock the boat.

It should be added, incidentally, that the collective leadership gained much needed popularity by liquidating Beria and diminishing the political role of the MVD. It did not matter that Beria was identified with the recent promises for a more liberal policy. Nor did it matter that Malenkov had been more responsible than any living member of the Presidium for the excesses of the purges of 1937 and 1938. In 1953, Beria was the chief symbol of a hated institution. In eliminating him, the new regime, anxious to make some concessions to the people, could count on profit without risk.

From the events just reviewed it is possible to draw some conclusions about the role of the political police in the present regime. It seems demonstrably clear that the political police has not, as an institution, taken an active part in policy-making; it has remained only the tool of the policy-makers. Beria, when he was chief of the police, did engage in matters of high policy. But the objectives he was trying to forward had nothing to do with the interests of the police organization. If anything, his "liberal" policy was contrary to the interests of the police as an institution. Moreover, Beria's case shows that, when the head of the political police becomes involved in decision-making at a high level, the other top leaders find the situation dangerous and intolerable.

Another conclusion that emerges from the history of the political police in the past three years is that the power and effectiveness of that organization have not diminished. The only important change has been^a reduction in the status of the police chiefs, as compared with the power wielded by Beria. Kruglov, until recently head of the MVD, and Serov, head of the KGB, both had long careers in the police. They

survived many purges in which they saw powerful police chiefs liquidated in the same manner as the humble. Though both were rewarded by various honors after Beria's death, neither had ever tasted the kind of power that Beria once enjoyed. Nor is it likely that these men had any desire to taste it. They knew their jobs and apparently concentrated their energies on running an efficient police system. But even this conception of service to the state did not save Kruglov's position. In replacing him with Dudorov, who apparently has had only a Party career, the Kremlin may be trying to restore the subordination of police to Party which existed in the early 1920's. Should Serov also be replaced by a Party official, such a trend would be confirmed.

Kruglov's removal is susceptible to still another, more sinister interpretation. If Dudorov should indeed be "Khrushchev's man," as some foreign observers claim, his own future and the stability of the regime may be facing a stormy period. For, if the head of either the MVD or the KGB were to begin playing an independent role or to exhibit personal loyalty toward any one of the members of the Presidium, he would be moving into

a treacherous area. Though Dudorov and Serov might avoid this danger by remaining passive, they may not be entirely free to do so. For the greatest potential threat to a police chief under a collective leadership would be an attempt by one of the leaders to obtain dictatorial powers. If this should happen, Dudorov or Serov would be forced to support one side or the other, and as a result might find themselves in the position of their unfortunate predecessors.

Of all the possible future developments in the Soviet Union, the role of the police under the collective leadership is probably the most predictable.

First, it can be foreseen with certainty that the political police will continue to be an important organ of the Soviet government. A political police is an absolute necessity for any regime that is uncertain of its legitimacy, be it a one-man or a collective dictatorship. The leaders of such a regime always fear a challenge to their authority, whether by intrigue at the top or by popular revolt. No matter whether the fear is justified, the regime must have a political police system to protect itself against real or imagined enemies.

Second, as long as the leadership continues to be collective, the leaders will prevent the political police from falling under the control of any one individual in the Presidium. For, with the police behind him, such an individual would be on his way to becoming another Stalin.

Third, the collective leaders will not permit any police chief to become a powerful or influential figure in the upper echelons of the Soviet government.

We can be so confident in our predictions only because the three conditions outlined above are necessary to the preservation of the equilibrium in the present collective leadership. The members of the Presidium will have no choice but to agree mutually on their attainment. Indeed, so essential are they to the survival of the present regime that the status of the political police and of its leaders will serve outside observers as a reliable barometer by which to judge the stability of the Soviet government.

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FBI

Date: 11/15/76

Transmit the following in _____
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(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

LEGAT, [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: **CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION PROCESS, THE;**
ANALYSIS OF;
THE RAND CORPORATION, SANTA MONICA, CALIFORNIA;
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated that he had seen in a recent issue of "Police Chief" magazine a review of a three-volume work prepared by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] of the Rand Corporation captioned as above.

The analysis of the Criminal Investigation Process by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] was supposedly written in 1975.

[REDACTED] would like to obtain a copy for the [REDACTED] and requested Legat's assistance in determining the availability of the study and its cost.

LEAD:

Los Angeles, an Santa Monica, is requested to contact the Rand Corporation to determine if a copy of the three-volume study can be made available to the [REDACTED] and its cost.

⑤ - Bureau

(1 - Foreign Liaison Unit)

(2 - Los Angeles)

1 - [REDACTED]

(6)

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Approved: [REDACTED] Special Agent in Charge

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
Attention: Foreign Liaison Unit

DATE: 12/10/76

FROM : [REDACTED] (RUC)

SUBJECT: CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION PROCESS,

THE ANALYSIS OF:

① RAND CORPORATION

Santa Monica, California

REQUEST BY [REDACTED]

Buded 12/29/76

OO: Bureau

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Re Bureau letter to Los Angeles, 11/29/76.

Enclosed are six copies of a letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above.

[REDACTED] Rand Corporation,
Santa Monica, California, was contacted by SA [REDACTED]

b6
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In view of above, no further action being taken in this matter at this time.

b6
b7C

- ③ - Bureau (Encl. 6) (AM)
1 - Los Angeles

(4)

1cc + 3me
TO [REDACTED]
O- [REDACTED]
12/10/76

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Los Angeles, California

December 10, 1976

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION PROCESS,
THE ANALYSIS OF;
RAND CORPORATION

Santa Monica, California


REQUEST BY [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] stated that
he had seen in recent issue of "Police Chief" magazine a
review of a three volume work prepared by [REDACTED]
and [REDACTED] of the Rand Corporation, captioned as above.

On december 6, 1976, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Criminal Justice Program, Rand Corporation, 1700 Main
Street, Santa Monica, California, 90406, telephone [REDACTED]
advised that he would be most pleased to send a copy of his works
concerning captioned matter direct to [REDACTED] of the [REDACTED]
without charge. The normal charge is \$4.00 per volume, however,
[REDACTED] has the option of charging or not for his work.
[REDACTED] further advised that he would send this promptly.

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ENCLOSURE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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